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Abstract
Reasoning with cases has been a primary focus of those working in AI and law who have attempted
to model legal reasoning. In this paper we put forward a formal model of reasoning with cases which
captures many of the insights from that previous work. We begin by stating our view of reasoning
with cases as a process of constructing, evaluating and applying a theory. Central to our model is
a view of the relationship between cases, rules based on cases, and the social values which justify
those rules. Having given our view of these relationships, we present our formal model of them, and
explain how theories can be constructed, compared and evaluated. We then show how previous work
can be described in terms of our model, and discuss extensions to the basic model to accommodate
particular features of previous work. We conclude by identifying some directions for future work.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A primary focus of those interested in modelling legal reasoning in Artificial
Intelligence and Law has been on reasoning with cases. Prominent examples of such work
are McCarty’s TAXMAN [30,31], HYPO [4,39], CABERET [40,46], BankXX [41], CATO
[1] and GREBE [12]. Attempts have also been made to capture reasoning with cases in
rule based systems, (e.g. [23,45]) and to model HYPO style reasoning in a rule based
framework [36]. In this paper we put forward a model of reasoning with cases which is
intended to capture many of the insights to be found in this body of work.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: tbc@csc.liv.ac.uk (T. Bench-Capon), sartor@cirfid.unibo.it (G. Sartor).
0004-3702/$ – see front matter  2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00108-5
98 T. Bench-Capon, G. Sartor / Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 97–143
A naive model of reasoning with cases, set up as a straw man in [17], can be expressed
as an equation, R × F =D, intended to express that a decision, D, can be deduced by the
application of a set of rules, R, to the facts of a particular case, F . Although the simplicity
of this picture has its attractions, it is problematic in every respect. The facts of a case
are not givens: cases need to be interpreted, and different lawyers will interpret them in
different ways. The rules, intended to be derived from precedent cases, are also not in
plain view; a case may interpreted in a variety of ways, and as Levi [28] stresses, the
interpretation of a precedent may change in the light of subsequent cases (see also [49,
p. 311ff]). Moreover, the rules that cases give rise to are inherently defeasible: when we
come to apply them we will typically find conflicting rules pointing to differing decisions,
so we need a means of resolving such conflicts. Thus none of describing the facts of the
case, extracting rules from precedents and applying these rules is straightforward. To model
reasoning with cases in a satisfactory way, we must account for all of the description of
cases, the extraction of rules and the resolution of conflicts.
A better way of seeing reasoning with cases is to see it as a process of constructing and
using a theory. As McCarty put it:
“The task for a lawyer or a judge in a “hard case” is to construct a theory of the disputed
rules that produces the desired legal result, and then to persuade the relevant audience
that this theory is preferable to any theories offered by an opponent.” [31, p. 285]
We endorse this view, and the construction, evaluation and use of theories is the central
point of our model. The arguments put forward when reasoning about cases can only be
considered within a context: it is the theory constructed by the arguer that supplies this
context.
Theory construction is intended to account for the interpretation required in determining
the description of cases and the derivation of rules from precedents. But now we have the
problem of how to deal with the conflicts amongst the rules that compose the theory. Since
a decision must be made in every case, we need a way to prefer one rule to another. Where
do these preferences come from? An answer can be found in the work of Berman and
Hafner [11,22]. Their solution involves looking to the purposes of law. This idea was first
mentioned in AI and Law in [19], drawing on jurisprudential work such as the Hart–Fuller
debate [18,26]. Gardener wrote [19, pp. 39–40].
“Every application of a predicate involves an ethical question as well as a question of
meaning. To resolve the ethical question, it is insisted by Moore, Fuller and others that
one must consult the purpose of the rule.”
The basic idea is that the law is not arbitrary but exists to serve certain social ends. Rules
derived from cases draw their justification from the fact that following them promotes some
desirable end. Thus when rules conflict, we resolve this conflict through a consideration of
the purposes served and their relative desirability. Precedent decisions record the ways
in which conflicts have been resolved in the past and can be seen as revealing preferences
amongst different purposes. Once revealed, these preferences can be used to resolve further
disputes. This argument is also present in the jurisprudential work of Perelman [32].
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Perelman’s stress is on the need to appeal to audience when presenting an argument, and
that this appeal is grounded in the values which acceptance of the argument would promote
or defend.
“If men oppose each other concerning a decision to be taken, it is not because they
commit some error of logic or calculation. They discuss apropos the applicable rule,
the ends to be considered, the meaning to be given to values, the interpretation and
characterisation of facts.” [32, p. 150]
These values, and the ordering of values, may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and
may also change over time. One important role of judges is to articulate the values held by
the society of which they are part, and their relative importance (for a fuller discussion of
Perelman’s ideas in the context of AI and Law, see [9]).
This is a second element that we wish to incorporate within our model, namely the
grounding of rules on social values, which enables someone aware of these values to decide
which argument should be preferred.
Throughout the paper we will illustrate our discussion with an example taken from [11],
which consists of three cases involving the pursuit of wild animals. In all of those cases,
the plaintiff (π ) was chasing wild animals, and the defendant (δ) interrupted the chase,
preventing π from capturing those animals. The issue to be decided is whether π has a
legal remedy (a right to be compensated for the loss of the game) against δ or not. In the
first case, Pierson v. Post, π was hunting a fox on open land in the traditional manner using
horse and hound when δ killed and carried off the fox. In this case π was held to have no
right to the fox because he had gained no possession of it. In the second case, Keeble v.
Hickeringill, π owned a pond and made his living by luring wild ducks there with decoys,
shooting them, and selling them for food. Out of malice δ used guns to scare the ducks
away from the pond. Here π won. In the third case, Young v. Hitchens, both parties were
commercial fisherman. While π was closing his nets, δ sped into the gap, spread his own
net and caught the fish. In this case δ won.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we will give a fuller informal
explanation of our view of the relationships between cases, features of the cases, rules
based on cases and values grounding those rules. In Section 3 we will give a more formal
account of our model of these relationships, and of the theory construction aspects of
reasoning with cases. The model we present is intended to be fairly neutral with respect
to previous work, incorporating common aspects of that work. Specifically the model is
intended to capture the analysis of Berman and Hafner [11]. In this section we will also
consider how the competing theories that might be constructed against a given background
can be used to explain decisions, and be compared and evaluated. We then show how our
model can be used to understand previous work by considering how various proposed
argument moves can be related to the model. In the next section we discuss how the
model can be extended to capture particular aspects previous work, proposing extensions to
accommodate the notion of dimensions found in early HYPO work, and a factor hierarchy
expressing relations between factors as found in CATO. Finally we identify directions for
future work and make some concluding remarks.
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2. Levels of justificationTo give a better explanation of the role of theories in legal reasoning we can consider
the ways in which people can disagree in a given case. Suppose we have a case: we may
immediately say that it should be found for one of the parties, say the plaintiff (if we chose
the defendant it would make no difference to the following). If our position is accepted,
well and good. But if our intuition is not shared, we will have to give reasons for our view.
Typically this will involve citing features of the case which we believe are reasons for
deciding for the plaintiff. Such reasons are often called factors in AI and Law. Thus we
describe the case using terms which tend to support a decision for our view. The person
disagreeing with us may now describe the case using factors of his own, which will this
time be reasons to decide for the defendant. Such descriptions do not come “written on”
the cases: they involve a degree of interpretation. At this point it is possible to argue over
the factors that should be used to describe the case, but let us suppose that we have resolved
this. We now have a case with a number of reasons to decide it one way and a number of
reasons to decide it in the other way. How do we justify our position in the face of this?
At this point we must ascend a level and introduce precedent cases. Precedents represent
past situations where these competing factors were weighed against one another, and a
view of their relative importance was taken. On the assumption that new cases should be
decided in the same way as precedent cases, if we can find a precedent with the same factors
as we have in the current case, then we can justify our choice using this precedent. If no
precedents exactly match or subsume the current case, we argue about the importance of
the differences. It is at this level that HYPO-like systems operate: but while they identify
the differences, they do not justify acceptance or rejection of the significance of these
differences.1
To justify these preferences we must ascend a further level. At this level we ask why
a factor is a reason for deciding for a given party. We argue that this is because deciding
for that party where that factor is present tends to promote or defend some value that we
wish to be promoted or defended. The conflict is thus finally stated in terms of competing
values rather than competing cases or competing factors. At this point the solution may
be apparent: our set of factors may relate to values which subsume our opponent’s values,
or be accepted by our opponent as having priority. Beyond this we can only argue about
which values should be promoted or defended, and so move beyond positive law, into the
realms of politics and general morality. Disagreement is still possible, but is no longer
a purely legal matter. Laws apply to a community, and this community is held to have
common priorities amongst values, and one role of the judge is to articulate these values.
Communities can change their values, but to disagree with the values currently adopted by
one’s community is to commit to effecting such a change, which is beyond the scope of
precedent-based legal argument.
The picture we see is roughly as follows: factors provide a way of describing cases.
A factor can be seen as grounding a defeasible rule. Preferences between factors are
1 In CATO [1] an effort is made to supply some assessment of the significance of distinctions by introducing
the notions of emphasising and downplaying distinctions. Even here, however, the arguments are indicated but
the user is left to be persuaded or otherwise.
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expressed in past decisions, which thus indicate priorities between these rules. From these
priorities we can abduce certain preferences between values. Thus the body of case law
as a whole can be seen as revealing an ordering on values. Fig. 1 gives a diagrammatic
representation of the process.
Fig. 1 depicts the three levels we need in our theory. Starting from decided cases
(precedents), we construct the next levels by identifying the rule-preferences revealed in
these cases, and the value preferences which these rule-preferences show. When the theory
is constructed it can be used to explain the precedents and to yield a predicted outcome in
new cases.
In the next section we will present our basic model of this process.
3. The basic model
In this section we will describe the elements of a theory, provide a set of operators for
constructing theories, and describe how theories can be used to explain past outcomes and
predict new ones. Because it is possible to construct more that one theory, we need a way of
comparing and evaluating theories. This topic will be discussed in Section 3.4. We end this
section by illustrating how our model can be used to illuminate previous work on reasoning
with cases, by construing argument moves found in the HYPO and CATO systems in terms
of our model.
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3.1. Elements of a theoryWe assume that our theory construction process will start from the store of available
knowledge, the background. This background will include six sets of elements: cases,
factors, outcomes, values, factor descriptions, and case factor-based descriptions, which
we denote respectively as Cbg, Fbg, Obg, Vbg, Fdsbg, Cfdsbg.
The essential building blocks of the theories are decided cases. A case can be seen
initially as a set of facts, together with a decision (an outcome) made on the basis of those
facts. But this has not typically been found to be the most useful way of representing cases
for case based reasoning purposes. Facts are in themselves neutral and not necessarily
relevant to the outcome. Explanation of outcomes has usually therefore been in terms
of dimensions (e.g., [4]) or factors (e.g., [1]). For discussions of the differences between
factors and dimensions see [10,42]. We will specifically return to dimensions in Section 4,
but for the moment we will speak of factors, following [11], and take as our example the
animals cases described in Section 1. Factors are an abstraction from the facts, in that a
given factor may be held to be present in the case on the basis of several different fact
situations, and importantly factors are taken to strengthen the case for one or other of the
parties to the dispute. In the above cases one such factor is whether plaintiff π can be
deemed to have possession of his quarry. This abstracts from the hounds not yet having
caught up with the fox, the ducks not yet having been shot and the fish still swimming
in the sea rather than landed on the boat, to a single factor. That in none of the cases
did π have contact sufficient to count as possession strengthens δ’s position in each case.
We make use of factors, and assume that a prior analysis of the cases has been carried
out, which determines a set of applicable factors, and for each case whether the factor is
present or absent. A variety of analyses of these example cases have been given in a number
of papers, including [5–7,10,11,22,37,44].
In our example, we consider the cases described above (taken from [11]): our cases
background is
Cbg = {Pierson,Keeble,Young}.
As far as the set of outcomes Obg, we consider only two possible outcomes: Π , the
outcome for π , indicating the recognition of a legal remedy to the plaintiff, and ∆, the
outcome for δ, indicating the denial of such a remedy. So our outcomes background is
Obg = {Π,∆}.
For ease of later notation, let as denote as ∼o the complement of outcome o, in particular
when o ∈ {Π,∆}, ∼∆=Π , and ∼Π =∆.
As far as factors are concerned we identify four factors:
• πLiv = π was pursuing his livelihood (Keeble, Young), favouring Π ,
• πLand = π was on his own land (Keeble), favouring Π ,
• πNposs = π was not in possession of the animal (Pierson, Keeble and Young),
favouring ∆,
• δLiv = δ was pursuing his livelihood (Young), favouring ∆.
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So, our factors background is:Fbg = {πLiv, πLand, πNposs, δLiv}.
We also need to link factors to values. We say that the reason a factor favours an outcome
is because deciding for that outcome in a case where that factor is present promotes or
defends some value, which it held that the legal system should promote or defend. In the
example, following several of the analyses of the cases (e.g., [5]), the factor πNposs helps
to promote clarity in the law and so discourage needless litigation; factor πLand helps
promote the enjoyment of property; and factors πLiv and δLiv help to safeguard socially
desirable economic activity. We thus have three values:
• Llit = Less Litigation,
• Prop = Enjoyment of property rights,
• Mprod = More productivity.
So, our value background is:
Vbg = {Llit,Prop,Mprod}.
We need to associate with each factor the outcome favoured and the value promoted. We
therefore represent information about factor f favouring outcome o in order to promote
value v in the form of a factor description 〈f,o, v〉. For simplicity, in this paper we assume
that each factor promotes only one value, although the framework here introduced could,
if desired, be straightforwardly extended to allow sets of values in factor-descriptions.
Definition 1 (Factor description). A factor description is a three tuple
〈f,o, v〉 ∈ Fbg ×Obg × Vbg.
For the example, our background factor descriptions are:
Fdsbg =
{〈πLiv,Π,Mprod〉, 〈πLand,Π,Prop〉, 〈πNposs,∆,Llit〉,
〈δLiv,∆,Mprod〉}.
Note that Fdsbg contains, as it is typically the case, both factors favouring the plaintiff and
factors favouring the defendant.
A way of representing cases can now be defined, which we call case factor-based
descriptions, since cases are described through factors.
Definition 2 (Case factor-based description). A case factor-based description is a three
tuple 〈c,F, o〉 ∈ Cbg × Pow(Fbg)×Obg.
Our background set of case factor-based descriptions is
Cfdsbg =
{〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉, 〈Keeble, {πLiv,πLand,πNposs},Π〉,
〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},Π〉, 〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},∆〉}.
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Note that Cfdsbg contains one description for each precedent (Pierson and Keeble) and two
descriptions for the new case (Young) which has not been decided or is assumed to be so
for the sake of the argument. This is, as we will see, to allow both parties to argue that
Young should have the outcome they wish.
We can use these definitions to introduce some dependent notions. First of all, we view
a rule as a connection between a set of factors and an outcome:
Definition 3 (Rule). A rule is a pair 〈F,o〉 ∈ Pow(Fbg)×Obg.
In any rule 〈F,o〉, we say that the set of factors F is the antecedent of the rule, and
outcome o is its consequent. For example,
〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉
is a rule having antecedent {πLiv,πLand}, and consequent Π . A rule indicates that its
antecedent (the presence of all factors it includes) is a reason for its consequent. We view
rules as inherently defeasible. No suggestion that the presence of factors F conclusively
determines outcome o is intended. By calling this connection between a reason and its
output a “rule” we also do not intend to suggest that the rule prevents or excludes the
consideration of other reasons (as in the notion of a rule used in [38] and in [23]). Though
those stronger, and more specific notions of a rule are frequently used in legal theory, and
are relevant in many contexts, we do not need them to present our model.
In our model, rules are based on factors: the antecedent of a rule is formed from
factors favouring the outcome which forms the consequent. From a given set of factor
descriptions we can only construct those rules which link a set of factors having the same
outcome, according to those descriptions, to that outcome. In particular, we consider that
a rule is possible (or constructible) if and only if it is constructible from the given factor
background.
Definition 4 (Possible rule). 〈F,o〉 is a possible rule if and only if for each fi ∈ F ,
〈fi, o, vi〉 ∈ Fdsbg.
Note that each factor in F must have the same outcome, but not necessarily the same
value. We denote the set of possible rules as Rposs. Among the possible rules, we call
primitive rules those rules which correspond exactly to one factor (their antecedent is a set
with only one element).
Definition 5 (Primitive rule). 〈{f }, o〉 is a primitive rule if and only if 〈f,o, v〉 ∈ Fdsbg.
We now introduce a way of getting from rules to values. The idea is that following a
rule promotes all values which are promoted by factors in the rule antecedent (when the
outcome in the rule-consequent is followed).
Definition 6 (rval). The function rval :Rposs → Pow(Vbg), maps possible rules to sets
of values: for all f ∈ F,v ∈ rval(〈F,o〉) if and only if there is a factor description
〈f,o, v〉 ∈ Fds.
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Thus following a rule r will promote all the values in the set returned by rval(r). For
example, rval(〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉) returns {Mprod,Prop}, since both 〈πLiv,Π,Mprod〉
and 〈πLand,Π,Prop〉 belong to Fdsbg .
We now define the notion of how a rule may attack another.
Definition 7 (Attack). A rule 〈F1, o1〉 attacks a rule 〈F2, o2〉 if and only if o1 =∼o2.
For example, 〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉 attacks 〈{δLiv},∆〉.
An attack may or may not succeed, depending on which rule is preferred. Preferences
between rules are defined extensionally using the relation rpref.
Definition 8 (Rule-preference). A preference for rule r1 over rule r2, denoted as
rpref (r1, r2), is a pair 〈r1, r2〉 ∈Rposs ×Rposs.
It is intended to be read as “r1 is preferred to r2”. A rule-preference relation is a
irreflexive transitive binary relation Rpref ⊆ Rposs × Rposs. One central feature of our
theory construction model will be the analysis of the way in which parties build alternative
preference relations. Note that preferences may exist between rules which do not attack
one another. We can now define defeat:
Definition 9 (Defeat). A rule r1 defeats a rule r2 in regard to a set of rule preferences Rpref ,
if and only if r1 attacks r2 and not rpref (r2, r1).
For example suppose that
rpref (〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉, 〈{δLiv},∆〉) ∈ rpref .
Then 〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉 defeats 〈{δLiv},∆〉.
Values are also preferred to one another. Moreover combinations of values can be
preferred to other combinations of values.
Definition 10 (Value preference). A preference for value-set V1 over value-set V2, denoted
as vpref (V1,V2), is a pair 〈V1,V2〉 ∈ Pow(Vbg)× Pow(Vbg).
A value preference relation is a irreflexive transitive binary relation Vpref ⊆ Pow(Vbg)×
Pow(Vbg). Whether a rule is preferred to another rule or not depends on the values it
promotes or defends.
Axiom 11. rpref (r1, r2) if and only if vpref (rval(r1), rval(r2)).
We are now in a position to define a theory:
Definition 12 (Theory). A theory is a five-tuple 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, where:
• Cfds⊆ Cfdsbg,
• Fds⊆ Fdsbg,
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• R ⊆Rposs,
• Rpref ⊂Rposs ×Rposs,
• Vpref ⊂ Pow(Vbg)× Pow(Vbg).
The theory thus contains descriptions of all the cases considered relevant by the
proponent of the theory, descriptions of all factors chosen to represent those cases, all
rules available to be used in explaining the cases, and all preferences between rules and
values available to be used in resolving conflicts between rules. A theory is thus an explicit
selection of the material available from the background, plus further components that are
constructed from the selected background material.
3.2. Constructing theories
We assume that at the outset all of 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉 are empty. The theory
is then built up using a number of theory constructors. We will define these theory
constructors in terms of their pre- and post-conditions. Essentially we need constructors to
build up each element of the theory five-tuple. We begin by seeing how we can add cases.
Definition 13 (Include-case).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, and
• 〈c,F, o〉 ∈ Cfdsbg.
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfdsnew,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, with
• Cfdsnew = Cfds+ 2〈c,F, o〉.
Essentially we can select any case in Cbg, and choose to include, from Cfdsbg, one of
its possible descriptions. These are the cases that we aim to explain with our theory. Each
party must include in his theory the current case, also called current situation, that is the
case which is the object of the dispute. The current case has not yet been decided (or it
is assumed so for the sake of the argument), and each party is claiming that it should be
decided for their side. This is modelled here by assuming that two versions or the current
case are contained in Cfdsbg, one with outcome Π (to be included in π ’s theories) and one
with outcome ∆ (to be included in δ’s theories).
Cases bring with them factors, but we are not forced to consider in our theory all the
factors associated with a case. We may believe some factors to be irrelevant. Levi, [28] has
shown that it is not always obvious which factors should be considered when describing a
case. We must therefore explicitly include each of the factors we wish to consider.
Definition 14 (Include-factor).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, and
2 We write S + a to mean S ∪ {a}, and S − a to mean S − {a}.
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• 〈f,o, v〉 ∈ Fdsbg.Post condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fdsnew,Rnew,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, with
• Fdsnew = Fds+ 〈f,o, v〉,
• Rnew =R + 〈f,o〉.
Note that a factor, if included in the theory, is always a reason for deciding for one party
or the other. Therefore the factor brings with it its associated primitive rule.
Cases typically contain several factors favouring a given party. Therefore we need a way
of extending primitive rules so that they can be tailored to particular cases. These rules will
contain more antecedents, and thus in general represent more specific, and hence safer,
reasons to decide for the favoured party than primitive rules. Factors can be merged only if
they have the same outcome.
Definition 15 (Factors-merging).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, and
• {〈F1, o〉 . . . 〈Fn,o〉} ⊆R.
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,Rnew,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, with
• Rnew =R + 〈{F1 ∪ · · · ∪ Fn}, o〉.
Sometimes a case may lack some factors that were part of the antecedent of a rule used
in a previous case. To make this rule applicable to the new case we must broaden it by
dropping one or more of the antecedents. This is a common move in case based reasoning
which we reflect in the following definition.
Definition 16 (Rule-broadening).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, and
• 〈F1, o〉 ∈R,
• F2 ⊂ F1.
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,Rnew,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, with
• Rnew =R + 〈F2, o〉.
Note that the rule obtained by rule-broadening could also be built up from primitive
rules using factors-merging. In a sense therefore, this theory constructor is superfluous.
We have included it, however, because it represents a move very common in accounts of
case based reasoning.
A major role played by cases is to indicate preferences between rules. Assume that a
theory T includes two conflicting rules, 〈F1,Π〉 and 〈F2,∆〉, with no preference between
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them, and a decided case 〈c,F,Π〉, to which both rules are applicable (F1 ⊂ F,F2 ⊂ F ).
As it stands, the theory cannot explain the decision, since the conflicting rules attack each
other and, in the absence of preferences, the attack is successful. But we can now ask: what
does the case tell us about the relative merits of the two rules? We believe that the case,
interpreted in the light of theory T , tells us precisely that the first rule was preferred to the
second in that case. This is what one must presuppose, if one believes that theory T was the
basis of the decision in c, i.e., that it prompted the decision-maker of case c to decide for
Π . In other words, in the framework provided by T , one is authorised to assume or abduce
that rpref (〈F1,Π〉, 〈F2,∆〉), since this is required if T is to explain the decision in c. This
assumption is not arbitrary, but rather grounded on the evidence provided by precedent
c (similar to the way in which scientific theories are grounded in the evidence provided
by empirical observations). Accepting this preference between two rules also commits us
to a preference for the values promoted by the preferred rule over those promoted by the
defeated rule. We therefore introduce a theory constructor to include such abductions based
on the evidence of previous decisions in our theories.
Definition 17 (Preferences-from-case).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, and:
• 〈c,F, o〉 ∈ Cfds,
• 〈F1, o〉 ∈R, where F1 ⊆ F ,
• rval(〈F1, o〉)= V1,
• 〈F2,∼o〉 ∈ R, where F2 ⊆ F ,
• rval(〈F2,∼o〉)= V2.
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref new,Vpref new〉 with
• Rpref new = Rpref + rpref (〈F1,p〉, 〈F2,∼p〉),
• Vpref new = Vpref + vpref (V1,V2)〉.
We can also use value preferences to derive rule preferences. If we know that a value
is preferred to another value, we may deduce from Axiom 11 above, that rules promoting
this value are preferred to rules promoting the other value.
Definition 18 (Rule-preference-from-value-preference).
Pre-condition: current theory is
• 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉 and:
• {r1, r2} ⊂R,
• rval(r1)= V1,
• rval(r2)= V2,
• vpref (V1,V2) ∈ Vpref .
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref new,Vpref 〉, with
• Rpref new = Rpref + rpref (r1, r2).
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Sometimes we will simply wish to assert a preference between rules, even though this
cannot be justified on the basis of previous cases, or existing preferences between values.
In doing so we commit to expressing a preference amongst the corresponding values.
Definition 19 (Arbitrary rule preference).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, and
• {r1, r2} ⊂R.
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref new,Vpref new〉, with
• Rpref new = Rpref + rpref (r1, r2),
• Vpref new = Vpref + vpref (rval(r1), rval(r2))〉.
Similarly we may wish to assert a preference between values.
Definition 20 (Arbitrary value preference).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, where
• {〈f1, o1, v1〉, 〈f2, o2, v2〉} ⊆ Fds.
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈C,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref new〉 with
• Vpref new = Vpref + vpref (v1, v2).
These arbitrary preferences are often required to enable a theory to justify a position
when no position is determined by previous cases. What they do is make quite explicit the
preferences that are being used to justify that position. In so doing they can pinpoint points
of disagreement between the disputants, which will be resolved when the case is decided.
Definitions 13–20 give us all we need to construct theories that can be advanced as
explanations of particular case law domains.
3.3. Using theories
The purpose of constructing a theory is to explain cases. We must therefore introduce
the notion of explaining a case.
Definition 21 (Explaining). A theory 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉 explains a case c if and
only if
• 〈c,F, o1〉 ∈ Cfds,
• 〈F1, o1〉 ∈R,
• F1 ⊆ F ,
• there is no rule 〈F2, o2〉 ∈ R, such that F2 ⊆ F and 〈F2, o2〉 defeats 〈F1, o1〉.
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Informally, the definition says that a case is explained if (a) we have a rule which allows
us to conclude the outcome of the case on the basis of factors present in the case (as
described in the theory) and (b) this rule is not defeated by any other rule in the theory
whose antecedent is satisfied in the case. The overall aim of a disputant is to construct a
theory that explains the current case, with the outcome desired by that disputant.
Let us illustrate this by constructing some theories to explain the three wild animal
cases. We will suppose that Young has not yet been decided, that is, Young is our current
case. If we wish to argue for the plaintiff, we will include the case with the outcome
desired by the plaintiff, 〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δliv},Π〉, in our theory, and then construct
a theory which explains it. Conversely if we wish to argue for the defendant we will include
〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δliv},∆〉 as the starting point of our theory.
A simple pro-defendant theory can be constructed using include-case to add Pierson and
include-factor to add πNposs (for clarity we include the names of the theory components):
T1: 〈cases: {〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δliv},∆〉, 〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉},
factors: {〈πNposs,∆,Llit},
rules: {〈{πNposs},∆〉},
rule prefs: ∅,
value prefs: ∅〉.
This theory expresses the view that the plaintiff had no remedy (∆) in Pierson, since he
did not have possession of the animal (πNposs), which is indeed a reason for ∆, according
to the rule 〈{πNposs},∆〉, which is extracted from factor description 〈πNposs,∆,Llit〉.
Exactly the same reasoning also explains why the plaintiff should have no remedy in Young
also. No preferences are necessary: In T1,R contains a single rule, and hence this rule is not
attacked, and so cannot be defeated: it thus allows T1 to explain both Young and Pierson.
The plaintiff can, however, produce a theory relying on Keeble, and subsuming T1:
T2: 〈cases: {〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},Π〉,
〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉,
〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉},
factors: {〈πNposs,∆,Llit〉, 〈πLiv,Π,Mprod〉},
rules: {〈{πNposs},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉},
rule prefs: {rpref (〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉)},
value prefs: {vpref (Mprod,Llit)}〉.
This theory is obtained, starting from T1, by including Keeble, including factor 〈πLiv,Π,
Mprod〉 (Π was pursuing his livelihood, favouring Π , so as to promote value Mprod),
and using preferences-from-case to get the required rule and value preferences from
Keeble. Like T1, T2 implies that the plaintiff had no remedy in Pierson since he did
not have possession of the animal. However, T2 also implies that the plaintiff had a
remedy (Π ) in Keeble since he was pursuing his livelihood (πLiv). Although the rule
〈{πNposs},∆〉 applies to Keeble, this rule is defeated, since πLiv supportsΠ more strongly
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than not having possession of the animal (πNposs) supports ∆ (from the preference
rpref (〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉)). According to the same reasoning, T2 implies that
Young, which shares with Keeble factors πLiv and πNposs, should also be decided for Π .
Note that it is the rule-preference rpref (〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉), derived from Kee-
ble, which allows the rule 〈{πLiv},Π〉 to defeat the rule 〈{πNposs},∆〉. This means that
the theory can explain why Keeble was decided for Π and why Young should be decided in
the same way. Note also that no description for the additional ∆-factor in Young, i.e., δLiv,
has been included in T2, and therefore this factor is not available to contest the explanation.
Similarly, the theory does not consider the additional Π -factor in Keeble, i.e., πLand (Π
was on his own land). According to the proponent of T2, neither of these factors is relevant.
The defendant can, however, make use of those factors and respond to T2 in two different
ways, depending on which of them he chooses to include. First he might add Keeble and
factors πLiv and πLand to T1 to get T3a:
T3a: 〈cases: {〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉,
〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉},
factors: {〈πNposs,∆,Llit}, 〈πLiv,Π,Mprod〉, 〈πLand,Π,Prop〉},
rules: {〈{πNposs},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πLand},Π〉},
rule prefs: ∅,
value prefs: ∅〉.
At this point, neither Young, nor Keeble is explained, since in the absence of preferences,
rules attacking each other defeat each other (this is the case for 〈{πNposs},∆〉, and
either 〈{πLiv},Π〉, or 〈{πLand},Π〉). Clearly, the defendant does not want to explain
Keeble as the plaintiff did, i.e., by using the rule 〈{πLiv},Π〉 with the preference
rpref (〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉). This would lead, as we have just seen, to Young
being decided for the plaintiff, on the basis of the same reasoning. He can, however,
avoid that, by using factors-merging to add the rule 〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉, and preferences-
from-case to add the preference derived from Keeble, taking into account these factors,
rpref (〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉). In this way the theory distinguishes Keeble
from Young: it explains why Keeble was decided for Π without implying the same decision
for Young. The plaintiff had a remedy (Π ) in Keeble since he was both pursuing his
livelihood (πLiv) and on his own land (πLand), and the combination of these two factors
supports Π more strongly that not having possession of the animal (πNposs) supports
∆ (according to the preference rpref (〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉)). Note that the
preference derived from Keeble is now different from that in the earlier theory: Keeble
is explained by giving priority to the rule 〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉 rather than to the rule
〈{πLiv},Π〉. Therefore, the reasoning of Keeble cannot now be applied to Young, where
there is only πLiv (and not πLand) to support decision Π .
T3b: 〈cases: {〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉,
〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉},
factors: {〈πNposs,∆,Llit}, 〈πLiv,Π,Mprod〉, 〈πLand,Π,Prop〉},
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rules: {〈{πNposs},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πLand},Π〉, 〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉},
rule prefs: {rpref (〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉)},
value prefs: {vpref ({Mprod,Msec},Llit)}〉.
Unfortunately T3b does not explain why Young should be decided for ∆. For this purpose,
one would need the rule preference rpref (〈{πNposs},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉), which would
have to be either added arbitrarily or derived from the arbitrarily added value preference
vpref (Llit,Mprod). (Remember that one’s preference is arbitrary when it does not explain
any precedent, but only supports the decision one wishes to have in current case.)
T3c: 〈cases: {〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉,
〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉},
factors: {〈πNposs,∆,Llit}, 〈πLiv,Π,Mprod〉, 〈πLand,Π,Prop〉},
rules: {〈{πNposs},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πLand},Π〉, 〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉},
rule prefs: {rpref (〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉), rpref (〈{πNposs},∆〉,
〈{πLiv},Π〉)},
value prefs: {vpref ({Mprod,Msec},Llit), vpref (Llit,Mprod)}〉.
T3c suffices for the defendant, but the resort to arbitrary preferences is not desirable.
A different tack for the defendant would be to ignore πLand and add δLiv instead to T2.
T4a: 〈cases: {〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉,
〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉},
factors: {〈πNposs,∆,Llit}, 〈πLiv,Π,Mprod〉, 〈δLiv,∆,Mprod〉},
rules: {〈{πNposs},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{δLiv},∆〉},
rule prefs: {rpref (〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉)},
value prefs: {vpref (Mprod,Llit)}〉.
Now, by merging the primitive rules for πNposs and δLiv, introducing the value
preference vpref ({Mprod,Llit},Mprod), and using this to derive the rule preference
rpref (〈{πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈πLiv,Π〉), an explanation of Young can be obtained.
T4b: 〈cases: {〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈Pierson, {πLiv},∆〉,
〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉},
factors: {〈πNposs,∆,Llit}, 〈πLive,Π,Mprod〉, 〈πLand,Π,Prop〉},
rules: {〈{πNposs},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{δLiv},∆〉, 〈{πNposs, δLiv},∆〉},
rule prefs: {rpref (〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈πNposs},∆〉), rpref (〈{πNposs, δLiv},∆〉,
〈{πLiv},Π〉)},
value prefs: {vpref (Mprod,Llit), vpref ({Mprod,Llit},Mprod)}〉.
Therefore, according to theory T4b, Young should be decided for ∆ since in Young the rule
〈{πNposs, δLiv},∆〉 is not defeated. This seems, according to [11], to be the theory used by
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the judges in Young. This explanation does rely on the introduction of a preference that is
arbitrary, in the sense of not being supported by precedents. However it might be held that
vpref ({Mprod,Llit},Mprod) is not entirely arbitrary on a different ground, namely since
{Mprod}, is a subset of {Mprod, Llit}. The idea is that if all values are good, then a more
inclusive set of values must be better that a less inclusive set (cf. [37] and [44]). This idea
could be adopted into our framework by adding a theory constructor which allows one to
introduce preferences for any set of values over its own proper subsets. We believe that this
assumption is reasonable in many contexts, but possibly not in all, because of interferences
between values: if two values are incompatible, then promoting only one of them can be
better then promoting the two of them at the same time. So, we do not wish to enshrine
this as a general and necessary feature of our approach, and since such preferences can
always be introduced as arbitrary value preferences if desired, the relevant theory can still
be constructed. None the less we would expect a preference of this sort to be acceptable in
most cases, and for particular purposes we might want to use the additional constructor to
allow such preferences to be distinguished from those which are merely arbitrary.
3.4. Evaluating theories
In the above discussion we produced four theories, each of which would explain the
decision in Young. How do we choose between them? Intuitively theories are assessed
according to their coherence. We will not, however, even attempt to develop a precise
notion of coherence in this paper. For coherence in law, there is a discussion in [2] and
for a general discussion of coherence and theory change, see [47,48]. For a recent attempt
to develop some formal criteria with which to assess theories see [24]. In this paper we
will do no more than indicate some considerations which might lead to one theory being
preferred over another.
Firstly, we demand as much explanatory power as possible from our theories. In
this context explanatory power can be approximately measured by the number of cases
explained. More exactly, since different cases may have different weights (one case being
more recent, or having been decided by a higher court, etc.) we should consider also the
relative importance of the sets of cases that the competing theories can explain. We cannot
consider here the details of the metrics for such a comparison, which is also dependant on
the features of the legal system under consideration. At the very least, however, we can
certainly say that theory T1 has more explanatory power than theory T2, if T1 explains all
precedents explained by T2 and some others, so that the precedents explained by T1 are a
proper superset of the cases explained by T2.
Secondly we can require theories to be consistent, in the sense that they should be
free from internal contradiction. Note that we allow theories to include conflicting rules
applicable to the same case, and we assume that these conflicts are solved through
preferences. The contradictions we wish to avoid are those concerning rule and value
preferences, i.e., the rpref and vpref relations. Thus we can require that theories do not
contain both rpref (r1, r2) and rpref (r2, r1) in Rpref, and do not contain both vpref (v, v′)
and vpref (v′, v) in Vpref. Such incoherence is explicit. There is also implicit incoherence
when there is a value preference which would allow the introduction of a rule preference
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which would produce an incoherence in Rpref, or where the transitivity of the preference
relations can be used to derive an explicit contradiction.
A third classically desirable feature of scientific theories is simplicity. This could be
measured in terms of the number of factor descriptions in F . If we can explain a set of
cases without introducing a given factor, this is a simpler theory than one which does
include that factor. Suppose we extend T4b above to include factor πLand.
T5: 〈cases: {〈Young, {πLiv,πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉,
〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉},
factors: {〈πNposs,∆,Llit〉, 〈πLiv,Π,Mprod〉, 〈δLive,∆,Mprod〉,
〈πLand,Π,Prop〉},
rules: {〈{πNposs},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{δLiv},∆〉, 〈{πLand},Π〉,
〈{πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉},
rule prefs: {rpref (〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉),
rpref (〈{πNposs, δLiv},∆〉, 〈{πLiv},Π〉)},
value prefs: {vpref ({Mprod,Msec},Llit), vpref ({Mprod,LLit},Mprod)}〉.
Suppose we now have a new case in which the facts of Keeble are present, except that
the plaintiff is hunting on common land. T4b would explain a decision for the plaintiff,
whereas T5 would not explain either outcome. To explain an outcome for the plaintiff,
T5 would need the value preference vpref (Mprod,Llit) (T5a), and to explain an outcome
for the defendant, the value preference vpref (Llit,Mprod) (T5b), so as to get the required
preference between the rules 〈{πLiv},Π〉 and 〈{πNposs},∆〉. In either case such an
introduction would be arbitrary. We would therefore expect the plaintiff to rely on T4b,
whereas the defendant would advance the more complicated theory T5b. If the case were
to be found for the defendant, we could justify the complication of T5 by its additional
explanatory power, but if it were found for the plaintiff we should have no reason to
complicate T4b, since we get no gain in explanatory power. If decided for the plaintiff,
there would be no reason to think that πLand was a relevant factor at all. Indeed Berman
and Hafner, [11] argues that πLand plays no significant role in the three cases under
consideration.
An argument could, however, be mounted for preferring theories with more factors.
Whenever a theory does not consider a factor that was present in one of its cases, that
factor can be introduced, so jeopardising any rule (and value) preferences included in the
theory based on that case, and so threatening its ability to explain its cases. The use of
factor πLand in T3 above to challenge T2 is an example of this. Thus a theory is safer in
accordance with the completeness of the factors it considers when using a case to derive a
rule preference. Whether we should look for simplicity or safety depends on the status of
the factors. If they have been used in the past decisions, completeness is desirable, but if,
even though they do provide a reason, they have played no part in previous decisions,
simplicity is to be preferred. Such a choice requires reference back to the full text of
decisions, and cannot be settled in a general way.
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Finally a theory is better in so far as less recourse to arbitrary preferences has been made.
In moving from T5 to T5a and T5b above it was necessary to add an arbitrary value prefer-
ence. Such moves can only be justified externally to the theory, by an appeal to intuition
or the like. In only one case does this seem to be entirely convincing, namely the arbitrary
preference in T4b, vpref ({Mprod,Llit},Mprod), does seem plausible because the preferred
value is a superset of the other value. As we have said above, we might even wish to have
an additional theory constructor legitimising the introduction of such value preferences.
3.5. Modelling argument moves in the basic theory
It is now interesting to relate the moves made in a HYPO-style argument to the above
account of theories. A reconstruction of two of these moves, in terms of its own formalism,
has been given in [36]. Where appropriate, we will make comparisons with this work.
A key element of our perspective on case based reasoning, is that reasoning with cases
involves a number of related, but distinct, activities: namely first constructing a theory,
then using the theory to explain cases, and finally evaluating competing theories, so
as to adjudicate between competing explanations. The above discussion was structured
around these three elements. Given this perspective, it is possible that argument moves in
traditional case based systems, which do not make this distinction, conflate these elements.
3.5.1. Citing a case
Citing a case just involves extending a theory with one additional precedent case.
Typically, however, when this is done for a purpose, citing a case also involves expanding
the theory with rules and preferences so that it can explain the cited case, and others
included in the theory. An example above is T1, which cites Pierson in support of the
defendant in Young by introducing the case 〈Pierson, {πNposs},∆〉, and a rule sufficient to
explain it, that is 〈{πNposs},∆〉. This citation is a particularly simple one, since the theory
does not contain any rule which would require the case to have a different outcome. If the
theory already includes such a rule, than the citation of a case also requires the introduction
of a preference which explains why the case deserved the decision it had as a matter of
fact, through the constructor preferences-from-case. As an example of this more complex
type of citation, consider where the plaintiff π constructs theory T2 by citing Keeble. At
this stage π introduces, besides the case 〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉 and the rule
〈{πLiv},Π〉} also the preference rpref (〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉), which enables the
theory to explain Keeble. Pragmatically the best case to cite is the one which includes as
many factors in common with the current case as possible. This allows the most specific,
and thus safest, rule to be constructed, and thus pre-empts several possible challenges.
Thus citing a case is essentially a move of theory construction, although considerations as
to which is the best case to cite looks forward to the evaluation of the theory. Moreover,
as implemented in HYPO, the criterion for choosing the best case favours safety over
simplicity in theory evaluation.
3.5.2. Counter examples and distinctions
HYPO permits two different responses to a cited case: providing a counterexample
and distinguishing the case. Providing a “trumping” counterexample is the stronger move
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because it will include another case in an opponent’s theory so as to licence rule preferences
such that the resulting theory will explain both the counterexample case and the cited
case, besides giving the current case the result desired by the citing party. It thus wins
on explanatory power. The use of Keeble in T2 is an example of this move. Introducing
counterexamples is part of theory construction, but their strength derives from theory
evaluation, in that an “as on point” counterexample does no more that display a failure to
explain certain cases on the part of the theory, whereas the trumping counterexample gives
rise to a new theory superior in explanatory power. In [37] the idea is that counterexamples
can be evaluated not in terms of on-pointness, but in terms of a comparison between the
values promoted. A trumping counterexample will always succeed because it promotes at
least as many values as the case to which it is a counterexample (in [37]) a set of values is
always preferred to its proper subsets. On the other hand, a non-trumping counterexample
both lacks a value present in the precedent and has a new value not present in the precedent,
so whether it succeeds depends on how these values are compared. A counterexample is
dismissed if the required value preference cannot be added to the theory. Indeed the theory
may already contain value preferences which show that the counterexample is ineffective.
In addition to distinguishing cases according to differences along shared dimensions,
which will be considered in Section 4, there are two ways of distinguishing a case in
HYPO. Either one points to a factor favourable to one’s opponent present in the precedent
and absent in the current case, or one points to a factor favourable to oneself present in the
current case and absent in the precedent. Here we discuss only the first of these; similar
considerations apply to the other.
One way of distinguishing a case involves introducing a new factor f , which is in favour
of the opponent, and which is not already present in the opponent’s theory. This factor is
not contained in the current case, but is present in the precedent licensing the preferences-
from-case move which produced the preference rpref (〈F1, o〉, 〈F2,∼o〉), which allowed
the opponent’s theory to explain the current case. Once the new pro-opponent factor f
is introduced, the old rule 〈F1,p〉, which explained why the precedent was decided for
the opponent (and why the current case should be decided in the same way), is extended
into 〈F1 ∪ {f },p〉, and a new preference rpref (〈F1 ∪ {f }, o〉, 〈F2,∼o〉) is provided to
explain the precedent. The latter preference does not apply to the current case (which does
not contain factor f ). Moreover, once the new, more specific, preference is available, the
old preference becomes unnecessary to explain the precedent, and so fails to provide a
convincing ground for the decision of the current case.
The introduction of factor πLand in T3 above exemplifies the distinguishing move:
by introducing this additional factor, the defendant was able to transform the rule
〈{πLiv},Π〉 into the rule 〈{πLiv,πLand},Π〉, which he then used to explain the case
〈Keeble, {πLiv,πNposs,πLand},Π〉, according to the preference rpref (〈{πLiv,πLand},
Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉). The new rule (and the corresponding preference) are not applicable
to the current case, Young, which has factors πLiv,πNposs, δLiv, and does not contain
πLand, which is required if the new rule is to be applied. On the other hand, in this new
theory (resulting from adding to T3 the new rule and preference), the old rule 〈{πLiv},Π〉
and the corresponding preference rpref (〈{πLiv},Π〉, 〈{πNposs},∆〉) can be dismissed as
being redundant since they have no explanatory function. Therefore according to the new
theory, a Π decision in Keeble is consistent with a ∆ decision in Young, which is what the
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defendant wanted to establish. The move is less powerful that a trumping counterexample
because it does not form the basis for a different decision in the current situation, but
merely blocks the rule which the opponent needs. In conclusion, this theory construction
move involves a factor rather than a case. The effect of the move is to render the original
theory weaker because it makes its rule preference arbitrary rather than grounded in a
precedent.
An as-on-point counterexample can also be seen as the combination of a distinguishing
move together with a case which grounds a new alternative theory, based on different
factors. This new theory can, of course, then be subject to a distinguishing move itself.
We would then end up with two theories which both require arbitrary preferences in order
to explain the current case. To be effective, the distinguishing factor must relate to a value
which can be shown to be preferred, so that arbitrary preferences are not required. This
is what happened above in T4b when δLiv was used to distinguish Young from Keeble.
This is an example of the second kind of distinguishing move (i.e., one introduces a new
factor favourable to oneself), but its greater effect comes from the value associated with
the distinguishing factor, not from it being an example of this other way of distinguishing
a case.
3.5.3. Emphasising strengths and showing weaknesses not fatal
There are four other argument moves introduced in CATO [1]: emphasise strengths,
show weaknesses not fatal, emphasise a distinction and downplay a distinction. The last
two require an extension to the basic model and will be considered in Section 4.2.
The first of these simply corresponds to introducing more cases which are explained by
the theory, with factors shared with current case, thus increasing the theory’s explanatory
power. Again these moves can be seen as constructing a theory which will be evaluated as
better. Showing weaknesses not fatal is perhaps more interesting, in that it seems to suggest
a different understanding of the rules derived from cases from that described above. For
the absence of a factor to be fatal, it would have to be a necessary condition, and as we
have described the situation above, case law can never give us such conditions, but only
defeasible rules. The move would also involve including cases found for the desired side,
but this time containing factors favourable to the other side which lead to defeated rules. In
our terms therefore it can be seen as an attempt to increase the safety of the explanations
in the theory, by anticipating and pre-empting the introduction of additional factors. It is
also possible that such cases may licence the introduction of preferences which contradict
preferences arbitrarily introduced by an opponent.
4. Extensions to the basic model
The theories constructed in the basic model given in the last section provide a very
simple account of theory construction for reasoning with cases. In this section we consider
two extensions to the basic model intended to capture insights of two important systems
developed in this area, HYPO [3,4], which takes a more sophisticated view of how cases
should be described, and CATO [1], which allows multi-step arguments through the use of
a hierarchy of factors.
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4.1. DimensionsIn Section 3 we presented our model in terms of the approach used by Berman and
Hafner [11]. In fact there are considerable limitations in this approach. Consider the case
of Pierson. Using the factors identified in [11] it would appear that the plaintiff had no
case to present. But further consider the pro-defendant factor πNposs(the plaintiff has no
possession of the animal), and assume that it can be applied whenever the plaintiff has not
caught the animal. As set up, this is an all or nothing affair, in which either plaintiff has
caught the animal (so that the factor does not hold), or has not done so (so that the factor
holds). Under the first condition (the animal has not been caught) it does not matter whether
the plaintiff has seen the animal, whether he was in hot pursuit of it, or even whether he
has wounded it (perhaps mortally). All of these situations are treated by πNposs as being
equivalent ways of realising the pro-∆ factor.
We do not, however, have to see the situation this way. We could see instead a range
(discrete or continuous) of positions between seeing the animal and actually possessing
it, and the points on this range as being progressively more favourable to Π and
less favourable to ∆. The factor-based perspective transforms this range into a binary
alternative: according to πNposs having failed to catch the animal is a reason for finding
for the defendant, whereas if the animal has been caught there is no such reason. However,
factor πNposs is not the only way in which this transformation can take place. Instead of
the pro-∆ factor πNposs we might have used a pro-Π factor, πChase, which was intended
to cover all cases in which the plaintiff had given chase: according to this choice, having
pursued the animal is sufficient to establish a reason for finding for the plaintiff, and only
failing to start a chase would not instantiate this reason. Note that the situation existing
in Pierson (plaintiff was chasing the animal though it was not yet caught), would favour
the defendant when seen from the perspective of factor πNposs, while it would favour the
plaintiff when seen from the perspective of factor πChase. Consider also πLiv (the plaintiff
was pursuing his livelihood). While the plaintiff in Pierson was not earning his living he
might have been acting out of a number of progressively less favourable motives, such as
altruism (foxes are vermin and a threat to farmers), pleasure, or even malice (if it was the
defendant’s pet fox). Perhaps the correct factor was one which would apply if the plaintiff
was earning his living or acting out of concern for his neighbours. Had this factor been
available, another pro-plaintiff factor would have been available in Pierson. Considerations
such as these are present in the text of the judgement in Pierson. The judgement speaks of
“caught or mortally wounded” and a dissenting opinion expressed the view that the social
utility of the plaintiff’s fox hunting was so great that the activity should be encouraged and
protected by law.
The original conception of HYPO (e.g., [3,4,39]) accommodated this kind of reasoning
by using not factors but dimensions.3 Dimensions were intended to be a spectrum of
3 The differences between factors and dimensions were the subject of several conversations between the
authors, Edwina Rissland and Kevin Ashley at the International Conference on AI and Law in St. Louis in 2001.
Since this paper was written, other work has published on this topic. Bench-Capon and Rissland [10] argue for
the need to use dimensions rather than factors and Rissland and Ashley [42] provide a useful discussion of these
two notions.
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possible degrees for an aspect of the affair, and a given side was to be favoured according
to the extent that the position on this spectrum approached the end favourable for that side.
Thus for possession we could see a possible dimension πControl, representing the level of
control which the plaintiff has over the animal, with possible degrees such as 〈no-contact,
seen, started, wounded, mortally-wounded, captured〉, which favours Π according to the
extent to which capture was approached, and favours ∆ to the extent to which no-contact
was approached.
Seen in this way, choosing a factor is not a matter of simply picking one property
favouring one side of the dispute from a pre-existing background store of such properties,
but rather involves selecting a significant point within a dimension from which a factor can
be formed and linking that point to an outcome. This selection implies that the realisation
of the dimension to that point is sufficient to favour the chosen outcome. Therefore for
a plaintiff factor, all positions in the span from the chosen point towards the plaintiff
extreme will also realise the factor, and for a defendant factor all positions in the span from
the chosen point towards the defendant extreme will also realise the factor. Dimensions
have interesting connections with the notion of quantity spaces as found in qualitative
reasoning (e.g., [16]), and the points which determine factors to have similarities to the
limit points of that theory. Exploring these connections further might enable exploitation
of the mechanisms of qualitative reasoning such as qualitative proportionality to make
more precise the notion of the influence of a fact on the outcome of the case. We must,
however, leave such exploration for future work.
Dimensions also need to be related to values, as were factors. If a factor is a reason for
deciding for a particular side because to do so would promote some value, then a dimension
is an increasingly strong reason for deciding for a side as its position approaches its most
favourable extreme because deciding for one side as the dimension goes in towards that
side’s extreme more probably or more strongly promotes some value. Thus we should see
the positions of a dimension as progressively more certainly promoting some values as we
move towards an extreme. Two types of value need to be distinguished: those which are
more surely promoted by deciding for the plaintiff as we approach the plaintiff extreme
and those which are more surely promoted by deciding for the defendant as we approach
the defendant extreme.
This can be illustrated by considering πControl, with positions 〈no-contact, seen,
started, wounded, mortally-wounded, captured〉. This dimension can be seen as being
supported by two values, reduction of litigation (Llit), towards the defendant’s extreme
(the beginning of the positions list), and property rights (Prop), towards the plaintiff’s
extreme (the end of the list). In fact, as we move towards the defendant extreme, i.e.,
when the plaintiff’s control over the animal is more tenuous, we approach less clear cut
situations. Deciding for the plaintiff in those situations would be more likely to encourage
litigation in other similar cases, and would increasingly do so the less the plaintiff’s control.
If judges were to decide this way, hunters who missed the game they were pursuing, would,
whenever they believed it was captured by other hunters, begin suing the latter, claiming to
have been the first to wound, start, or even see the animal. Note that, from this perspective,
if having wounded the animal is a form of control so tenuous that we have a reason to find
for the defendant, mere pursuit will be a stronger reason to so find. Property rights, on the
other hand, are more surely promoted by deciding for the plaintiff when he has a stronger
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control over the animal: in those cases deciding for the plaintiff would mean to give legal
backing to the physical possession he has gained over the animal, and so recognise and
encourage private appropriation. If merely starting a fox is a reason to find for the plaintiff,
then mortal wounding will be a stronger reason.
Our discussion of the dimension πControl shows how one can extract from one
dimension both pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant factors. In both cases we need to choose a
starting point for the factor, but the behaviour of the factor will be different. Pro-plaintiff
factors will promote a pro-plaintiff value, and will cover all positions in the range spanning
from the chosen point to the pro-plaintiff extreme. Pro-defendant factors will promote a
pro-defendant value, and will include all positions in the range spanning form the chosen
point to the pro-defendant extreme.
The need to form factors from dimensions brings factor descriptions within the theory
construction process. Let us see how we might formalise this. First we replace the
background set of factors Fbg, with a background set of dimensions Dbg. Each dimension
d ∈Dbg refers to a property that can be present in the cases to a range of different extents.
The ways of realising one dimension are ordered in a spectrum, according to the extent in
which they realise the dimension: we therefore refer to them as the possible positions in
the dimension’s spectrum. So, we have a background set of possible positions Posbg which
indicate the possible ways in which dimensions can be realised. Dimension-descriptions
can be defined as follows:
Definition 22 (Dimension-description). A dimension-description is a four tuple 〈d, 〈p1 . . .
pn〉, 〈o↓, o↑〉, 〈V↓,V↑〉〉 where
• d ∈Dbg,
• 〈p1 . . .pn〉 ∈ Posbg × · · · × Posbg, is a spectrum of positions realising increasing
degrees of d (pi+1 realises d more than pi ),
• 〈o↓, o↑〉 ∈Obg ×Obg, is a pair of complementary outcomes, such that
◦ o↓, the downward outcome, is increasingly favoured by decreasing degrees of d (o↓
is favoured bypi more than it is favoured by pi+1),
◦ o↑, the upward outcome, is increasingly favoured by increasing degrees of d (o↑ is
favoured by pi+1 more than it is favoured by pi ),
• 〈V↓,V↑〉 ∈ pow(Vbg)× pow(Vbg), is a pair of sets of values, such that
◦ V↓, the downward values, are more probably promoted by o↓ as d decreases (o↓
under condition pi promotes each v ∈ V↓ more probably than o↓ under pi+1 does),
◦ V↑, the upward values, are more probably promoted by o↑ as d increases (o↑, under
condition pi+1 promotes each v ∈ V↑, more probably than o↑ under pi does).
Using the example of πControl given above, this would give the following dimension-
based description:
– Property: πControl
– Spectrum: 〈no-contact, seen, started, wounded, mortally-wounded, captured〉
– Outcomes: 〈∆,Π〉
– Values: 〈{Llit}, {Prop}〉
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which we will write as〈πControl, 〈no-contact, seen, started, wounded, mortally-wounded, captured〉,
〈∆,Π〉, 〈Llit,Prop〉〉
(we drop parentheses on sets of values containing only one value).
As we said, the set of background factors description Fdsbg is now substituted with a
set of background dimension descriptions Ddsbg. Cases can now be described in terms of
dimensions rather than factors. Each case will be characterised by a set of dimensional
qualifications Dq, where each dimensional qualification 〈d,p〉, indicates that position p
for dimension d was realised in the case.
Definition 23 (Case dimension-based description). A case dimension-based description is
a three tuple 〈c,Dq, o〉 where:
• c ∈Cbg, and
• for every 〈d, 〈p1 . . .pn〉, 〈o↓, o↑〉, 〈V ↓,V↑〉〉 ∈ Ddsbg there is at most one pair
〈d,p〉 ∈Dq, with p ∈ 〈p1 . . . pn〉.
Let us denote the set of all case dimension-based descriptions available in the
background as Cddsbg. Now we will consider how to go from dimensions to factors,
extracting factors from dimensions and transforming dimension-based descriptions of
cases into factor-based descriptions.
Factor descriptions can be constructed out of dimensions by choosing one of the
positions on the spectrum, one outcome, and one of the values promoted by that outcome.
If the outcome is o↑, then that positions and all position with an index higher than that
position will mean that the factor is present. Similarly if the outcome is o↓, that position
and all positions with an index less than that position will mean that the factor is present.
Let us assume that our background also contains a set of factor names Fnbg. A factor
description thus becomes:
Definition 1b (Factor description). A factor description is a five tuple 〈f,d,p, o, v〉,
where:
• f ∈ Fnbg,
• 〈d, 〈p1 . . .pn〉, 〈o↓, o↑〉, 〈V↓,V↑〉〉 ∈ Ddsbg,p ∈ 〈p1 . . .pn〉, and
• either o= o↓ and v ∈ V↓, or o= o↑, and v ∈ V↑.
For example, given the dimension πControl, described above, one could construct the
pro-plaintiff factor πSureCatch (π is sure of the catch), with description 〈πSureCatch,
πControl,mortally-wounded,Π,Prop〉, or the pro-defendant factor πNposs (π has no
possession) with description 〈πNposs,πControl,mortally-wounded,∆,Llit〉. We call the
set of all factor descriptions of this sort which are constructible from the background
dimensions Fdsposs (the possible factors).
The construction of a factor description 〈f,d,pi, o, v〉 from a dimension 〈d, 〈p1 . . .pn〉,
〈o↓, o↑〉, 〈V ↓,V↑〉 amounts to saying that the realisation of the chosen position pi ,
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supports the chosen outcome o, so as to promote the indicated value v. This has the
following implications:
(a) pi cannot support the outcome complementary to o unless appeal is made to a different
value (since one single feature cannot be the ground for two complementary outcomes
considered with respect to a single value),
(b) if o= o↓, than any pj such that j < i also more strongly supports o,
(c) if o= o↑, then any pj such that j > i more strongly supports o.
It is important to stress that a factor 〈f,d,pi, o, v〉 applies not only to the cases that
exhibit the dimensional position pi , but also to the cases exhibiting a position that more
strongly favours o along the dimensional spectrum. In other words, pi is the lowest bound
for the realisation of the factor, which is also realised by more o-favourable positions. For
example, according to the dimension πControl, with 〈no-contact, seen, started, wounded,
mortally-wounded, captured〉 and outcomes 〈∆,Π〉, the pro-plaintiff factor πSureCatch is
realised not only when the animal was mortally wounded, but a fortiori when the animal
was captured, whereas the pro-defendant factor πNposs is realised not only when the
animal was mortally wounded, but a fortiori in all positions preceding mortally-wounded
in the dimensions list. We can next define the notion of a factor subsuming a dimensional
qualification (i.e., the qualification being a way of realising the factor).
Definition 24 (Subsuming). A factor f with description 〈f,d,pi, o, v〉 ∈ Fdsposs, sub-
sumes the dimensional qualification 〈d,pj 〉 if and only if pi = pj or pj is more favourable
to o then pi (i.e., if o= o↑ then j  i , and if o= o↓ then j  i).
For example, factor SureCatch above subsumes both πControl(mortally wounded) and
πControl(captured)while it does not subsume πControl(wounded) nor πControl(started).
Note that building factors out of dimensions gives a degree of discretion: it requires
setting the bound at which one outcome is supported along one dimension. Different
choices in this regard would lead to different interpretations of the cases. So while the
factor πSureCatch favours outcome Π only from the point where the animal is mor-
tally wounded, a factor πContact (Π had contact with the animal), with description
〈πContact,πControl, started,Π , security of possession〉 would imply that just starting the
animal (and a fortiori wounding it, even though not mortally) supports the outcome Π .
Now given the set Fds of all factor descriptions so far constructed, we can transform
a case described via dimensions into that case described via factors. We now define a
function, factorise(Dq, Fds), which takes a set of dimensional qualifications Dq, and a set
of factor-descriptions Fds, and returns the set of factors described in Fds that subsume
dimensions in Dq.
Definition 25 (Factorise). Factor f ∈ factorise(Dq,Fds) if and only if there are 〈d,pi〉 ∈
Dq and 〈f,d,pj , o, v〉 ∈ Fds, such that f subsumes 〈d,pi〉.
For example assume the following dimensions:
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• 〈πControl, 〈no-contact, seen, started, wounded, mortally wounded, captured〉,
〈∆,Π〉, 〈Llit,Prop〉〉,
• 〈πLand, 〈δProperty, δLease,other people’s property, communal property,πLease,
πProperty〉, 〈∆,Π〉, 〈Freedom,Prop〉〉,
where πLand expresses the connection between the plaintiff and the land where he was
chasing (which is most tenuous when he is on the defendant’s property, and strongest when
he is on his own property). Assume also to have constructed the following factors from the
dimensions above:
• 〈πNposs,πControl,mortally-wounded,∆,Llit〉 and
• 〈πOwns,πLand,πLease,Π,Prop〉.
Now, given what we said above, how should we translate two dimensional qualifications,
such as πControl(mortally wounded) (in regard to his control over the animal, π had
wounded it) and πLandcommunal property) (in regard to his connection to the land, π
was on a communal property) into factors? The result is given by
factorise({πControl(mortally wounded),πLand(communal property)},
{〈πNposs,πControl,mortally wounded,∆,Llit〉,
〈πLand,πOwns,πLease,Π,Prop〉} = {πNposs}.
Transforming the dimension-based description 〈c,Dq, o〉 of a case into its factor-based
description 〈c,F, o〉, requires factorising the dimensional qualifications Dq into factors F .
The factorisation of cases will, of course, be relative to Fds, the factor descriptions so far
constructed. To achieve this we define a function FactoriseCase(〈c,Dq, o〉,Fds), which
takes the dimension-based description 〈c,Dq, o〉 of a case and a set of factor descriptions
Fds, and returns the factor-based description 〈c,F,p〉 of that same case, which results
from factorising Dq into F :
Definition 26 (FactoriseCase). FactoriseCase(〈c,Dq, o〉,Fds)= 〈c, factorise(Dd,Fds), o〉.
For example, factorise(〈c1, {πControl(mortally wounded),πLand(πLease)},Π〉,
{〈πNposs,πControl,mortally-wounded,∆,Llit〉, 〈πOwns,πLand,πLease,Π,Prop〉})
returns 〈c1, {πNposs,πOwns},Π〉.
We also provide a function which factorises a set of cases only in regard to one factor.
This is the function ApplyFactor(Cfds, 〈f,d,pi, o, v〉), which takes as input a set of case
factor-based descriptions Cfds, and a factor description 〈f,d,pi, o, v〉). It returns the new
set of case factor-based descriptions which results from adding factor f to each case factor-
based description 〈c,F, o〉 ∈ Cfds, whenever f subsumes a dimensional qualification
〈d,pi〉 of case c.
Definition 27 (ApplyFactor). ApplyFactor(Cfds, 〈f,d,pi, o, v〉) is the set of all 〈c,F, o〉
such that 〈c,F ′, o〉 ∈ Cfds, and
124 T. Bench-Capon, G. Sartor / Artificial Intelligence 150 (2003) 97–143
• 〈c,F, o〉 = 〈c,F ′ ∪ f,o〉 when f subsumes 〈d,p〉 where 〈d,p〉 ∈ 〈c,Dq, o〉, or
• 〈c,F, o〉 = 〈c,F ′, o〉 otherwise.
We can now revisit the definitions of Section 3 supposing that we start from a set of
dimensions and a set of cases described through dimensional qualifications, rather then
with a set of factors and of cases described through factors.
The first point to note is that factor descriptions are now local to a theory, rather
than being available globally. Also, much of what was originally in the background to
a theory is now dependent on these factor descriptions. Suppose that Fds is the set of factor
descriptions in theory T , and FFds is the set of the names of all those factors. Now the set
of possible case factor-based descriptions which are obtainable with those factors are
CfdsFds = Cbg × Pow(FFds)×Obg
(each case description contains the name of the case, a set of the constructed factors, and
one outcome). The set of possible (constructible) rules is now relative to the constructed
factors.
Definition 4b (Possible rule). 〈F,o〉 is a possible rule, given factor descriptions Fds, if and
only if for each f ∈ F , 〈f,o, v〉 ∈ Fds.
Let us denote the set of rules which are possible relative to a set of factor descriptions
Fds, as RFds. Let us similarly denote preferences constructible from a rule set RFds, as
Pref Fds =RFds ×RFds.
Definition 12b (Theory). A theory is a five-tuple 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref , 〉, where:
• Fds is a set of factor descriptions of the form 〈f,d, e,p, v〉,
• Cfds⊆ CfdsFds,
• R ⊆RFds,
• Rpref ⊆ Rpref Fds,
• Vpref ⊆ Vpref bg.
Let us now see how we can add a factor to a theory. Adding a factor now requires
building it from some dimension description. However, we wish to block the use of
dimensions to produce two factors based on the same dimensional qualification with the
same value. Were this allowed, we would have the possibility of explaining cases using
multiple factors based on the same dimension and value, which we regard as undesirable
as representing counting a feature of the case twice, and intolerable where a case satisfies
both a pro-plaintiff and a pro-defendant factor based on the same dimension with the same
value. If we have two factors based on the same dimension and value available in the theory,
we need to choose which we wish to use. We thus modify Definition 14:
Definition 14b (Include-factor).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, and
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• 〈d, 〈p1 . . .pn〉, 〈o↑, o↓〉, 〈V↑,V↓〉〉 ⊆ Dds,
• 〈f,d,p, o, v〉 ∈ Fds,
• p ∈ 〈p1 . . .pn〉 and either o= o↑ and v ∈ V↑, or o= o↓ and v ∈ V↓,
• there is no 〈f ′, d,p′, o, v〉 ∈ Fds.
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfdsnew,Fdsnew,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, with
• Cfdsnew = 〈applyFactor(Cfds, 〈f,d,p, o, v〉),
• Fdsnew = Fds∪ {〈f,d,p, o, v〉}.
Notice that, when a set of factors Fds1 is expanded into a larger set Fds2, the sets
of the constructible rules and of the constructible preferences will also be expanded:
if Fds1 ⊂ Fds2, then RFds1 ⊂ RFds2 and Rpref Fds1 ⊂ Rpref Fds2. Besides include-factor
we need to rephrase include-case, since the background information only contains
dimension-based description of cases, which need to be transformed into factor-based
descriptions.
Definition 13b (Include-case).
Pre-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, and
• 〈c,F,p〉 ∈ Cddsbg.
Post-condition:
• current theory is 〈Cfdsnew,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉, with
• Cfdsnew = Cfds+ factoriseCase(〈c,F,p〉,Fds).
All the other definitions, subject to the relativity of the notions to Fds, can remain
essentially unchanged.
A suitable set of example dimensions for our example cases might be the following
(note that when one dimension goes only one way, favouring no outcome at one extreme,
we put 0 for missing outcome):
• 〈πControl, 〈no-contact, seen, started, wounded, mortally-wounded, captured〉,
〈∆,Π〉, 〈Llit,Prop〉〉,
• 〈πLand〈δProperty, δLease, otherPeopleProperty, communalProperty,πLease,
πProperty〉, 〈∆,Π〉, 〈MFreedom,Prop〉〉,
• 〈πMotive, 〈πMalice πSport,πLivelihood〉, 〈0,Π〉, 〈0,Mprod〉〉,
• 〈δMotive, [δMalice, δSport, δLivelihood], 〈0,∆〉, 〈0,Mprod〉〉.
The examples in Section 3.3 above all still apply, supposing that we have first used four
applications of make-factor to produce Fds, so that it includes the following factors based
on these dimensions:
• 〈πNposs,πControl,mortally wounded,∆,Llit〉,
• 〈πLand,πOwn,πProperty,Prop〉,
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• 〈πLiv,πMotive,πLivelihood,Π,Mprod〉,
• 〈δLiv, δMotive, δLivelihood,∆,Mprod〉}.
This section represents quite a significant extension to the simple model. It does give an
important gain in that it allows us to explore, if desired, the creation of factors rather than
taking them simply as given, which is useful since the available factors can significantly
bias our view of a case. It also allows the possibility of an additional argument move,
recognised in HYPO but not in CATO, or any other approach which ignores dimensions.
In HYPO when citing a case no comparison of strength along dimensions is made. Thus
in a new case similar to Pierson except that the fox had been wounded, Pierson would
be cited for the defendant, who would provide a theory explaining Pierson according to
factor 〈πNposs,πControl,mortally-wounded,∆,Llit〉, which also provides a ground why
the new case should also be decided for the defendant, according to the rule 〈{πNposs},∆〉.
In the response, however, the plaintiff can take a different position within the dimension
into account, and so would be able to point out that in this dimension the current situation
is more favourable to him. For example, he could build a factor πContact, meaning that
Π had contact with the animal, with description 〈πContact,πControl,wounded,Π,Llit〉,
and a factor πNoContact, with description 〈πNoContact,πControl, started,∆,Prop〉. The
first factor is satisfied in the new case (the factorisation of which includes πContact)
and produces a rule 〈{πContact},Π〉, while the second factor is satisfied in Pierson, and
produces the rule 〈πNoContact,∆〉, which contributes to explaining Pierson’s outcome.
What is happening here is that in the citation the factor is chosen so as to explain both
the current case and the precedent case, whereas in the response a different factor is chosen
from the dimension which will still explain the precedent, but which will not apply to
the current case. Essentially the disputants are making and including different factors in
their different theories. Similar moves are possible with respect to counterexamples and
their rebuttals. This is a very important type of move, but one which obviously requires
dimensions.
Factors have been found sufficient for some of the analyses we wish to subsume, and
for those the simpler model will suffice. We have, however, shown how we can treat the
richer analyses of the original HYPO system in a similar fashion. If we wished, we could
take a further step back, and bring the choice of dimensions into theory construction also,
by removing Dbg from the background and replacing it with a set of pairs of attributes and
unordered positions for these attributes, which would need to be turned into dimensions by
choosing a sub-set of the possible positions, and ordering them according to some social
value or values. We will not, however, pursue this further here.
4.2. CATO and a hierarchy of factors
After HYPO, Ashley began work, with Aleven, on the CATO system, most fully
reported in [1]. CATO did not use dimensions, but used factors like those in the basic
model. It did, however, make a different refinement to factors by organising them into a
hierarchy, with the presence of factors contributing to or detracting from more abstract
factors. This extra organisation permitted the introduction of two new argument moves,
emphasising distinctions and downplaying distinctions. To represent the factor hierarchy
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we need to modify the notion of factor as given in Definition 1, but differently from
the modification given to accommodate dimensions in Definition 1b. A fully satisfactory
account of these moves also requires a more elaborated notion of a case being explained
than that provided in Definition 21, so as to allow for arguments to be chained to an
arbitrary length, with the possibility of conflicts at different points in the chain. This is
impossible in the framework we have so far presented, since we do not allow chaining
of rules. A logic which would provide the necessary support is given in Section 4.2.1.
In Section 4.2.2 we show how this logic can be used to model the operation of the
factor hierarchy as used in CATO, and to allow for the new moves of emphasising and
downplaying distinctions.
4.2.1. An extended logic for using theories
The notions of explanation we proposed in Definition 21 above only allows for one step
inferences, where the final outcome of a case is directly supported by the factors in the
case description. To deal with abstract factors we adopt a very simplified variant of the
argumentation-based system proposed by Prakken and Sartor [34], but other logics would
be equally appropriate, if they can deal appropriately with prioritised conflicting rules. Let
us introduce a few simple notions (those notions can be expanded to take into account
issues such as those of undercutting [33] or pre-emption [27], but they are sufficient for
our purposes).
For simplicity let us view all elements in our knowledge representation as instances of
the same syntactic structure, which we call a conditional.
Definition 28 (Conditional). A conditional is a couple 〈Λ,λ〉 where Λ, the antecedent, is a
(possibly empty) set of literals (an atomic formula, or the negation of such a formula) and
λ, the consequent, is a literal.
In particular, any rule 〈Φ,β〉 can be viewed as a conditional, and in the same
way we can represent conditioned preferences. The unconditioned assertion that a fac-
tor occurs, or that a certain rule or value preference is the case, can be viewed
as a conditional with empty antecedents: 〈∅, ϕ〉, 〈∅, rpref (r1, r2)〉, 〈∅, vpref (r1, r2)〉. We
use the consequent of such degenerate conditionals as their abbreviations: rather then
〈∅, ϕ〉, 〈∅, rpref (r1, r2)〉, 〈∅, vpref (r1, r2)〉, we write respectively ϕ, rpref (r1, r2), vpref (r1,
r2).
Conditionals can be chained together to form arguments, where an argument is sequence
of conditionals such that each literal in the antecedent of any conditional occurs previously
in the argument, as the consequent of some conditional.
Definition 29 (Argument). A sequence of conditionals A = 〈〈Λ1, λ1〉 . . . 〈Λn,λn〉〉, is
an argument, if and only if any 〈Λi,λi〉 ∈ A is such that for each λj ∈ Λi , there is a
〈Λj ,λj 〉 ∈A with j < i .
This means that the consequent of any conditional in the argument can be derived, via
a sequence of modus ponens inference-steps, from previous elements in the inference. We
therefore say that all such consequents are the conclusions of the argument, and denote the
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conclusions of an argument A with Conclusions(A). For example, argument 〈α, 〈{α}, β〉〉
has conclusions α and β , that is Conclusions(A)= {α,β}.
Definition 30 (Defeat). An argument A1 defeats A2 if there are conditionals ψ1 ∈ A1 and
ψ2 ∈A2 such that:
• ψ1 attacks ψ2, and
• A2 does not have consequence rpref (ψ2,ψ1).
For example, arguments B1 = 〈α1, 〈{α1}, β〉〉 and B2 = 〈α2, 〈{α2},¬β〉〉 defeat one
another, since they contain conditionals (〈{α1}, β〉, 〈{α2},¬β〉) attacking each other, and
there are no preferences adjudicating the conflict.
Definition 31 (Strict defeat). A1 strictly defeats an argument A2 if A1 defeats A2, but A2
does not defeat A1.
For example argument B3 = 〈α3, 〈{α3}, β〉, rpref (〈{α3}, β〉, 〈{α2},¬β〉)〉 defeats B2,
but B3 is not defeated by B2, since B3 contains the preference rpref (〈α3, β〉, 〈α2,¬β〉)
which prevents defeat.
Our purpose is to establish which arguments and therefore which conclusions are
justified within a certain premises set. For an argument A being justified within a certain
premises set S (with A ⊆ S), we mean that A has no valid defeater within S: so long as
we accept as our premises set S, we need to endorse A and all of its conclusions. For
computing whether an argument is justified, the consideration of defeat between single
arguments is not sufficient, since a defeated argument can be reinstated when its defeaters
are strictly defeated by further arguments. For example, consider the three arguments:
B1 = 〈α1, 〈{α1}, β1〉, 〈{β1}, γ 〉〉,
B2 = 〈α2, 〈{α2}, β2〉, 〈{β2},¬γ 〉〉,
B3 = 〈α3, 〈{α3},¬β2〉, rpref (〈{α3},¬β2〉, 〈{α2}, β2〉)〉.
B1 is defeated by argumentB2, butB2 is strictly defeated by B3. B1 though being defeated,
is justified within the premises set S = B1 ∪ B2 ∪ B3 since it has no valid defeaters in S:
its only defeater, B2, is strictly defeated by B3, which has no defeaters within S.
Here we will only provide a procedural notion of “being justified”: an argument is
justified if and only if there is a proof for it. And, in the context of a premises set S, the
proof that an argument is justified takes the form of a tree of arguments belonging to S. In
this tree, nodes located at an even level (the level of a node being the distance from the root)
attack, directly or indirectly (i.e., by attacking its supporters), the root argument, while
nodes located at an odd level support, directly or indirectly (i.e., by attacking its attackers)
the root argument. The notion has considerable similarities to well-founded support in
truth maintenance systems and the well-founded semantics for logic programs (e.g., [14,
20]), and with other formalisms used in artificial intelligence and logic programming (see
in particular [15], and for other references to the relevant literature [35]). Here is a more
exact definition:
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Definition 32 (Proof tree). A proof tree for argument A, within premises set S, is a tree of
arguments from S, such that
• A is at 0-level (root),
• each Ai at an even-level node is followed by all of Ai ’s defeaters,
• each Ai at an odd-level node is followed by an Aj such that, Aj strictly defeats Ai ,
• odd level arguments are not repeated in the same branch of a tree.
A proof is a proof tree where no attack against the root argument A was successful
(since every branch terminates with a node supporting A), and that no further attacks are
possible:
Definition 33 (Proof ). A proof of argument A within premises set S, is a proof tree for A
within S, such that:
• each branch of the tree terminates with an even-level node,
• it is not possible to add further nodes.
Definition 34 (Justified argument). An argument A is justified within premises set S if and
only if there is a proof for A within S.
Let us denote as JustArg(S), the set of arguments which are justified within premises
set S. For example, let us assume we have the following set of premises:
• factors {α1, α2, α3},
• rules {〈{α1}, β1〉, 〈{β1}, γ 〉, 〈{α2}, β2〉, 〈{β2},¬γ 〉, 〈{α3},¬β2〉},
• preferences {rpref (〈{α3},¬β2〉, 〈{α2}, β2〉)}.
Then we can build a proof that argument 〈α1, 〈{α1}, β1〉, 〈{β1}, γ 〉〉 is justified. This would
be the corresponding proof tree:
0. 〈α1, 〈{α1}, β1〉, 〈{β1}, γ 〉〉∣
∣
∣
1. 〈α2, 〈{α2}, β2〉, 〈{β2},¬γ 〉〉∣
∣
∣
2. 〈α3, 〈{α3},¬β2〉, rpref (〈{α3},¬β2〉, 〈{α2}, β2〉)〉
It is now clear when a theory explains a case.
Definition 35 (Explaining). A theory 〈Cfds,Fds,R,Rpref ,Vpref 〉 explains a case c if and
only if:
• 〈c,F, o〉 ∈ Cfds,
• there is an argument A such o ∈ Conclusions(A) and A ∈ JustArgs(F ∪R ∪ Rpref ).
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4.2.2. Modelling CATO
In this section we use the logic developed above to give a model of CATO and its
argument moves.
First, to convey the required hierarchy information, we must allow our background
knowledge to include factors favouring intermediate results, besides the final outcomes
{Π,∆} of the dispute. To model this, we will need to allow for more then one
factor description for a given factor: if factor f promotes a certain final outcome
o1, via the intermediate outcomes o2, . . . , on, it will have description descriptions
〈f,o1, v1〉 . . . 〈f,on, v1〉. Note that we assume that the values promoted by the factor
remain the same. The intermediate outcomes will, in their turn, be factors favouring further
outcomes, which may still be intermediate, or may represent one outcome for the dispute.
This means that our background set of factors Fbg will include two sets: the set of concrete
factors Fcbg, which are to be used in describing the cases, and the set of the abstract factors
Fabg. Abstract factors will be both factors and outcomes: Fabg ⊆ Fbg and Fabg ⊆Obg. By
linking each factor to the outcome it produces, we obtain a tree where each intermediate
node (each node, except the root and the leaves of the tree), is both an intermediate outcome
and an abstract factor.
Abstract factors do not appear in the representation of the cases, but they will be
used in multi-step arguments, where the final outcome of a case is explained through a
sequence of chained rules. For example, suppose we have the hierarchy shown in Fig. 2.
If a case contains factor f6 and had decision o, its explanation may be based on the
argument 〈f6,〈{f6}, f3〉, 〈{f3}, f1〉, 〈{f1}, o〉〉. Note that any factor supports not only its
parent node: via its parent, it gives support to all of its ancestors (to avoid clutter, we
represent this only for factor f6 in Fig. 2). So, the factors background besides factor-
descriptions connecting each factor to its parent, e.g., 〈f6, f3,v〉, will also contain factor-
descriptions connecting each factor to all of its ancestors, shortcutting the intermediate
links, e.g., 〈f6, f1,v〉, 〈f6, o, v〉 (we may alternatively assume that these short cuts do not
need to be in the background knowledge, but can be introduced at the theory construction
stage).
A factor with multiple ancestors, has multiple factor descriptions, and so provides
the opportunity for the reasoning move that Ashley and Aleven call “downplaying a
Fig. 2. A factor hierarchy.
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distinction”. As we have seen above, distinguishing involves (a) adding a new factor which
applies to the precedent cprec and does not apply to the current case ccurr, and (b) explaining
the precedent by a rule including this factor. Downplaying the distinction of a precedent
consists in providing an explanation for both cprec and ccurr through a rule including an
abstract factor, which is an immediate consequence both of the distinguishing factor, and
of a different factor which can be established in the current case. Let us now go through
the process of distinguishing and downplaying the distinction. We assume the following
factor hierarchy:
Suppose the plaintiff’s theory T1 = 〈Cfds1,Fds1,R1,Rpref 1,Vpref 1〉 is such that:
(1) Cfds1 = {〈cprec,Fprec,Π〉, 〈ccurr,Fcurr,Π〉}, with Fprec = {f0, f1, g}, Fcurr = {f0,
f2, g},
(2) Fds1 = {〈f0,Π,v〉, 〈g,∆,v′ 〉},
(3) R1 = {〈{f0},Π〉, 〈{g},∆〉},
(4) Rpref 1 = {rpref (〈{f0},Π〉, 〈{g},∆〉}).
According to this theory, cprec has the following explanation: cprec had outcome Π since
rule 〈f0,Π〉 applies, which is stronger then rule 〈{g},∆〉. In other words, in premises set
Fprec ∪ R1 ∪ Rpref 1, argument A1 = 〈f0, 〈f0,Π〉, rpref (〈{f0},Π〉, 〈{g},∆〉)〉 is justified,
having no defeaters. The same explanation also holds for ccurr: A1 has no defeaters also in
Fcurr ∪R1 ∪ Rpref 1.
The defendant can reply by distinguishing cprec from ccurr. For this purpose she needs
to transform theory T1 into the following theory T2 = 〈Cfds2,Fds2,R2,Rpref 2,Vpref 2〉
which satisfies the following
(1) Cfds2 = Cfds1,
(2) Fds2 = Fds1 ∪ 〈f1,Π,v1〉,
(3) R2 =R1 ∪ {〈{f1},Π〉, 〈{f0, f1},Π〉},
(4) Rpref 2 = (Rpref 1 − rpref (〈{f0},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉)+ rpref (〈{f0, f1},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉).
Note that after removing the preference rpref (〈{f0},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉), the new preference
rpref (〈{f0, f1},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉) can be added by “preferences from case”. Theory T2 allows
the defendant to explain why cprec had decision Π , but does not support the conclusion
that ccurr should also have decision Π . In fact, cprec is explained in T2 by appealing to a
rule (〈{f0, f1},Π〉), which is not applicable to ccurr (since ccurr does not include f1). More
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exactly, the justified argument 〈f0, f1, 〈{f0, f1},Π〉, rpref (〈{f0, f1},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉〉, having
conclusionΠ , is available in Fprec∪R2∪Rpref 2, but is not available in Fcurr∪R2∪Rpref 2,
since f1 /∈ Fcurr .
Let us now consider the move “downplay distinction”. This move also exploits the
factors hierarchy, and in particular the fact that both factors f1 in Fprec and factor f2 in Fcurr
favour the abstract factor fa , which favours Π . To downplay the distinction the plaintiff
can build the theory:
T3 = 〈Cfds3,Fds3,R3,Rpref 3,Vpref 3〉 where
(1) Cfds3 = Cfds2,
(2) Fds3 = Fds2 ∪ {〈f1, fa, v〉, 〈f2, fa, v〉, 〈fa,Π,v〉},
(3) R3 =R2 ∪ {〈{f1}, fa〉, 〈{f2}, fa〉, 〈{fa},Π〉, 〈{f0, fa},Π〉},
(4) Rpref 3 = (Rpref 2 − rpref (〈{f0, f1},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉)+ rpref (〈{f0, fa},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉).
The plaintiff has removed from theory T2 above the unwanted preference rpref (〈{f0, f1},
Π〉, 〈g,∆〉), and has added, instead, the new preference rpref (〈{f0, fa},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉) (by
preferences from case). This preference again allows both cprec and ccurr to be explained
according the same reasoning: in both cases rule 〈{f0, fa},Π〉 is applicable, and prevails
over rule 〈g,∆〉. This rule and the corresponding preference, in fact occurs in two
arguments, which explains why Π should be the decision of cprec and ccurr, respectively:
• Aprec = 〈f0, f1, 〈{f1}, fa〉, 〈{f0, fa},Π〉, rpref (〈{f0, fa},Π〉, 〈g, ∆〉)〉, with Aprec ∈
JustArg(Fprec ∪R3 ∪ Rpref 3),
• Acurr = 〈f0, f2, 〈{f2}, fa〉, 〈{f0, fa},Π〉, rpref (〈{f0, fa},Π〉, 〈g,∆〉)〉, with Acurr ∈
JustArg(Fcurr ∪R3 ∪ Rpref 3).
So, the plaintiff has achieved the result of disarming the defendant’s attempt at distinguish-
ing cprec from ccurr: in his new theory a preference revealed by its explanatory role in the
precedent can also be used to support the outcome he wants in the current case.
Let us now consider a concrete example. Assume a new case where a patient was
cured by a doctor in a hospital, without there being a contract, and the doctor omitted to
give a therapy to the patient, so damaging his health: the factors are: Hospital, Omission,
HealthDamage. The issue to be decided is whether the doctor is liable for her omission:
we still use Π and ∆ to mean the outcomes respectively favouring the plaintiff and the
defendant, but now Π means “the doctor is liable”, and ∆ means “the doctor is not
liable”. Assume that there is a precedent cprec where a doctor was considered to be liable
for the damage suffered by a patient, a contract being in place, even if the damage was
due to an omission (the factors in cprec were: Contract, Omission, HealthDamage). Now,
HealthDamage favours outcomeΠ in accordance with the value of Health, while Omission
favours outcome ∆ in accordance to the value of Liberty (which seems to require that
nobody is punished for not taking an initiative). Assume also that the patient explains both
this case and the current situation (with output Π) according to the theory that causing
a health damage produces the liability of the doctor, even when the damage is caused by
omitting a therapy (rather then by providing a wrong therapy). In other words, he builds a
theory:
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T1 = 〈Cfds1,Fds1,R1,Rpref 1,Vpref 1〉 such that:(1) Cfds1 = {〈cprec,FprecΠ〉, 〈ccurr,Fcurr,Π〉}, with Fprec = {Contract, Omission,
HealthDamage} and Fcurr = {Hospital, Omission, HealthDamage},
(2) Fds1 = {〈HealthDamage,Π,Health〉, 〈Omission,∆,Liberty〉},
(3) R1 = {〈{HealthDamage},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉},
(4) Rpref 1 = rpref (〈{HealthDamage},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉},
(5) Vpref 1 = vpref (Health, Liberty).
This theory allows the patient to provide the same explanation for the precedent and the
current case: in both the rule that a doctor is liable for causing health damages applies,
and it prevails over the rule that there is no liability for omissions. In fact, argument A1 =
〈HealthDamage, 〈{HealthDamage}, Π〉, rpref (〈{HealthDamage}, Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉〉,
belongs to both Justarg(Fprec ∪ R1 ∪ Rpref 1) and JustArg(Fcurr ∪ R1 ∪ Rpref 1), since it
strictly defeats its only attacker, that is 〈Omission, 〈{Omission},∆〉〉.
The doctor may now distinguish the precedent from the current situation by claiming
that in the precedent there was a contract, i.e., she proposes a theory where a doctor’s
liability is explained by two factors, causing a health damage, and being bound by a
contract to provide adequate care (which requires a liability upon the defaulting party,
to advance the value of trust): only the combination of these two factors may prevail over
the principle that there should be no liability for omissions. This is done by producing the
following theory:
T2 = 〈Cfds2,Fds2,R2,Rpref 2,Vpref 2〉, where:
(1) Cfds2 = {〈cprec,FprecΠ〉, 〈ccurr,Fcurr,Π〉},
(2) Fds2 = {〈HealthDamage,Π,Health〉, 〈Omission,∆,Liberty〉, 〈Contract,Π,Trust〉},
(3) R2 = {〈{HealthDamage},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉, 〈{Contract},Π〉, 〈{HealthDamage,
Contract},Π〉},
(4) Rpref 2 = {rpref ({HealthDamage,Contract},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉)},
(5) Vpref 2 = vpref ({Health,Trust},Liberty).
In theory T2 there is an explanation why cprec, had decision Π , which is not applicable to
ccurr: this is given by the argument:
A2 = 〈HealthDamage,Contract, 〈{HealthDamage,Contract},Π〉,
rpref ({HealthDamage,Contract},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉)〉.
Note that A2 ∈ Justarg(Fprec ∪ R1 ∪ Rpref 1) but A2 is not available in the current case
Fcurr, since Fcurr does not contain factor Contract.
The patient may downplay this distinction, by claiming that the existence of the contract
implied that the doctor was warranting a careful performance, and that this was the real
reason why a doctor should be held liable under a contract, according to the value of trust.
He may also claim that the same warranty is also implicitly given by the practice of the
medical profession in a hospital, regardless of the existence of a contract, so that the doctor
in the current situation would still be liable for the same reasons (causing a health damage
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after warranting an adequate performance) that he was liable in the precedent. Here is the
new theory of the patient:
T3 = 〈Cfds3,Fds3,R3,Rpref 3,Vpref 3〉, where:
(1) Cfds3 = {〈cprec,FprecΠ〉, 〈ccurr,Fcurr,Π〉},
(2) Fds3 = {〈HealthDamage,Π,Health〉, 〈Omission,∆,Liberty〉,
〈Contract,Π,Trust〉, 〈Contract, Warrant, Trust〉, 〈Hospital, Warrant, Trust〉,
〈Warrant,Π,Trust〉},
(3) R3 = {〈{HealthDamage},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉, 〈{Contract},Π〉, 〈{Contract},
Warrant〉, 〈{Hospital},Warrant〉, 〈{Warrant},Π〉, 〈{HealthDamage,Warrant},Π〉},
(4) Rpref 3 = {rpref (〈HealthDamage,Warrant},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉)},
(5) Vpref 3 = {vpref ({Health, Trust},Liberty)}.
This theory allows the patient to explain both cprec and ccurr by using the same rule
〈{HealthDamage, Warrant},Π〉, and preference rpref (〈HealthDamage, Warrant},Π〉,
〈{Omission},∆〉). This is done through the following justified arguments, available respec-
tively in Fprec ∪R3 ∪ Rpref 3 and in Fcurr ∪R3 ∪ Rpref 3:
• A3,1 = 〈HealthDamage,Contract, 〈{Contract},Warrant〉, 〈{HealthDamage, Warrant},
Π〉, rpref (〈HealthDamage,Warrant},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉)〉,
• A3,2 = 〈HealthDamage,Hospital, 〈{Hospital},Warrant〉, 〈{HealthDamage, Warrant},
Π〉, rpref (〈HealthDamage,Warrant},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉)〉.
After downplaying, it is still possible to re-introduce a distinction, by claiming that the
distinguishing factor also causes another intermediate consequence, favourable to oneself,
which does not hold in the current situation. Remember that downplaying takes place after
one party distinguished precedent cprec from the current situation ccurr. This is obtained by
arguing that a factor f , which is only present in the precedent, was necessary for producing
the outcome o of the precedent, according to a rule 〈A∪ {f }, o〉. As we have just seen, the
opponent can downplay the distinction by showing that p was produced via an abstract
factor fa , and that fa follows both from the factor f in the precedent and the factor f ′ in
the current situation. At this stage, however, the distinguishing party can try to reinstate the
distinction, by showing that f also produces another intermediate factor fa2, which is not
produced by f ′.
Assume that the doctor, to reinstate the distinction, claims that the contract in the
precedent also implied that there was a consideration (which requires liability according to
the value of reciprocity), and that both consideration and warranty are required to ground
liability for health damages in cases of omissions. This is done by the following theory
T4 = 〈Cfds4,Fds4,R4,Rpref 4,Vpref 4〉, where:
(1) Cfds4 = {〈cprec,FprecΠ〉, 〈ccurr,Fcurr,Π〉},
(2) Fds4 = {〈HealthDamage,Π,Health〉, 〈Omission,∆,Freedom〉, 〈Contract,Π,Trust〉,
〈Contract,Warrant,Trust〉, 〈Hospital, Warrant, Trust〉, 〈Warrant,Π,Trust〉,
〈Contract,Consideration,Reciprocity〉, 〈Consideration,Π,Reciprocity〉},
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(3) R4 = {〈{HealthDamage},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉, 〈{Contract},Π〉, 〈{Contract},
Warrant〉, 〈{Hospital},Warrant〉, 〈{Warrant},Π〉, 〈{Contract},Consideration〉,
〈{Consideration},Π〉, 〈{HealthDamage, Warrant, Consideration},Π〉},
(4) Rpref 2 = {rpref (〈HealthDamage, Warrant, Consideration},Π〉, 〈{Omission},∆〉)}.
This theory again allows the doctor to explain cprec via a rule 〈{HealthDamage, Warrant,
Consideration},Π〉} which is not applicable to ccurr.
The dispute may then go on, with the patient still trying to downplay this further
distinction (e.g., for example, by claiming that the doctor was going to be paid for her
work at the hospital in any case, so that in a sense there was a consideration), and the
doctor trying to introduce further distinctions, still based on the absence of a contract in
the current situation.
An alternative, although more restrictive, way of downplaying distinctions, given in
[37], simply requires that some factor in the current case promote the same value as the
distinguishing factor. If this is so, although the factors differ, the competing rules return
the same values when given as arguments to rval, and thus can enjoy the same preference
relations.
In contrast, emphasising a distinction does not give rise to new theories: it only draws
attention to the non-availability of the downplaying move, and the consequent need for the
opponent to resort to arbitrary preferences to repair his theory. In [37] this is expressed
in terms of a difference between the values associated with the two sets of factors. The
very difference in values alerts us to the significance of the distinction, which requires a
consideration of the value preferences to resolve. The move is of course most effective, if
the distinction relates to a more highly prized value.
A recent paper by Roth [43] suggests some further moves that can be made to augment
the notions of downplaying and up-playing distinctions. These mostly turn on a richer
account of intermediate moves in arguments: for example, a factor may only promote an
intermediate factor in the presence of some other factor. His example is that the potential
to find another job may be an intermediate factor, but whether a particular job promotes
this factor depends on the current state of the labour market. Such moves would require a
more sophisticated logic to be used to apply the theories. It would also be an interesting
exercise to see what extensions to our basic formalism would be necessary to represent the
information needed to make such moves.
5. Future work
Given the above framework, we can identify a number of issues that we think that it is
important to explore. In this section we will briefly describe some of these.
5.1. Metrics for theory coherence
In Section 3.4 we discussed the notion of theory coherence in qualitative terms,
identifying a number of considerations that might lead us to think that one theory is
better than another. Such comparison is unsatisfactorily vague, however, and it would be
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interesting to see whether the comparison might be made more precise. We have reported
some steps towards this in [8]. In that paper we draw on the work of Thagard [47], which
developed a model for assessing competing scientific theories (for a more recent statement
of Thagard’s view in coherence, and for references to the coherence literature, see [48]).
The essential idea is to represent the evidence to be accounted for by a theory and the
tenets of a theory as nodes connected by links representing support and conflict. A set of
initial values (between 1 and −1) is assigned to these nodes, and these values are then
propagated, support links increasing the values of nodes, and conflict links decreasing
them. Moreover, links are subject to a rate of decay so that isolated nodes decrease in
value. This propagation is continued through a number of cycles, until the values of the
nodes stabilise. In Thagard’s interpretation of this process, nodes which end with a high
activation can be considered part of a coherent, and hence acceptable theory, while those
with a low activation do not form part of that coherent theory, and so should be rejected.
We adapted this approach to our theories of bodies of case law taking cases as providing
our evidence, and taking cases, rules, and preferences as nodes. These nodes can support
one another in several ways: rules may be applicable to cases, rules may give rise to
intermediate conclusions, rules can explain cases. Also rules may conflict with cases if
they appear to be applicable, and yet would suggest the opposite outcome for the case.
To deal with preferences, however, we needed to extend Thagard’s approach. The effect
of a rule preference is to render the less favoured rule inapplicable in a case. Thus the
preference does not conflict with the rule it disfavours, but rather with the ability of that
rule to conflict with the case to which it is deemed inapplicable. The preference thus should
be seen not as decreasing the value of the rule node, but a decreasing the value of the link
which adversely propagates its value to the case in question. In our model therefore the
weights of links are not fixed, but can be affected by the propagation process. In particular
preferences are in conflict with the links from the less favoured rules to cases where the
preference applies. We modelled our theories, such as those given in Section 3 above, as
a set of connected nodes, assign initial values to the nodes, and then propagated these
values until they stabilise, and which point we can see the average level of activation as an
indicator of the coherence of the theory.
These preliminary experiments yielded some encouraging results, and showed that the
numbers which emerged from the process accorded largely with our intuitions. A number
of technical issues were raised by the experiments, for which the interested reader is
referred to the original paper. Additionally the important question arises as to whether
the approach has any cognitive validity with respect to the ways in which lawyers evaluate
theories. Once the technical questions above have been answered, some kind of empirical
study will be required to see how far the judgements on theories given by this approach
can be seen as reflecting a legal consensus.
5.2. Comparison of values
A central tenet of our account of theories for case based reasoning is that preferences
between defeasible rules are justified in terms of preferences between sets of values. This
means that we need a principled way of comparing sets of values. This has not so far been
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much studied, but is something that needs to be investigated. In this section we will identify
some of the issues concerning this topic.
At least three questions need to be asked about values:
• Are values scalar? In the foregoing we have tended to see values as either promoted
or not. It could, however, be argued that values can be promoted to different extents,
according to which factor is involved, or, especially if we consider dimensions rather
than factors, the degree to which the factor is realised.
• Can values be ordered at all? We have assumed that they can, but it is possible to see
values as simply incommensurable.
• How can sets of values be compared? Is it always better that more values are
promoted? Can values conflict so the promotion of their combination is worse than
promoting either separately? Can several less important values together overcome a
more important value?
We have, in our model of Section 3, avoided these questions to some extent by requiring
that Vpref be defined extensionally. Certainly we do assume an ordering on values, and
it is important to us that different factors can promote the same value, and that the extent
of such promotion can be ignored. In order to explain Young we rely on the promotion of
Mprod by πLiv and δLiv to be “cancelled” when comparing sets containing them. Indeed
the utility of introducing value preferences as an explanation of rule preferences relies on
the ability of different factors to promote the same values, so that the set Vpref is smaller
than Rpref, allowing a preference revealed in a case concerning one set of factors to applied
in a case with different factors.
Two recent papers address these issues. Prakken [37] puts forward a formal account
of teleological reasoning for case based systems which has considerable similarity with
the basic thrust of our account. In particular Prakken explains rule preferences in terms
of value preferences. Prakken assumes an ordering on values, does not recognise different
degrees of promotion, and takes a position on comparison of sets.
Prakken first identifies an ordering on the values recognised within the theory, which he
terms fvalord. Because rules promote sets of values, he then requires a way of comparing
sets of values. He does this with a rule Valcomp , which expresses that a set of values, V1 is
better that a set of values V2 if for every value present in V2 but missing in V1 there is a
better value present in V1 but missing in V2. Essentially the most important value in a set is
the primary determinant of its status: lesser values are used as tiebreakers with sets which
contain exactly the same more highly rated values. Valcomp thus incorporates some choices:
it means that a set of values is always better than any of it strict sub-sets, but it also means
that if both sets being compared contain values not in the other set, the set containing the
most preferred of these values is always preferred, no matter how many values from the
other set it may be missing. For example given the ordering used in Section 3,
Prop > Mprod > Llit
a set containing Prop will always be considered better that one without it. For example, it
will give {Prop}> {Mprod,Llit}. In fact, although none of the example cases can test this
preference, it seems reasonable enough: deciding a case in favour a person poaching on
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another’s land who had caught a saleable animal would promote {Mprod, Llit}, whereas
deciding against him would promote {Prop}. Since poaching is generally held to be
undesirable, the preference would seem vindicated. It is unclear, however, whether this
principle would hold in general; it does not seem impossible that a combination of less
preferred values might be sufficient to defeat a single stronger value in some cases. We
would not, however, wish to advance as a general notion that a larger set always defeats a
smaller set: the poaching case provides a counterexample to this.
Hage in [25] offers a different approach to comparing sets of values (actually Hage
speaks of reasons rather than values, but we take his reasons as including our values).
Hage’s approach does not insist on an initial ordering on values, but does introduce
the notion of degrees of strength with which values are promoted. Hage provides a set
of rules for comparing sets, but these are not complete; certain sets of values will be
incommensurable. Thus Hage, gives us a relatively “safe” account, identifying those cases
with which anyone can agree, but remaining silent on cases that might be disputed.
Prakken, in contrast, offers a “bold” account, able to determine all questions, but not
necessarily fitting with our intuitions in every situation.
We believe that the way forward, given that the role of values has only recently been
identified, is to conduct some investigation into the way in which they are used in actual
legal practice. This will give us a handle on how we should resolve the questions posed at
the start of the section, and this in turn will inform the design of any machinery we wish to
develop to express the behaviour we identify.
5.3. Changes in the social context
In the model above, an important aspect is missing, namely, an account of the dynamics
of case law, as it depends on the evolution of the socio-political context. These dynamics
seems to undermine the very possibility of constructing a coherent theory of a case-law
domain: how is it possible to fit in a single theory cases which were decided differently,
even in the presence of the same constellations of factors and dimensions, since different
decisions were required by different contexts?
One way of approaching this issue (cf. [44]) is to focus on the link between factors and
values, which is represented in our factor descriptions. Let us recall that a factor description
had the form 〈f, v, o〉, and meant that by responding to factor f with outcome o, we would
promote value v. This makes both an evaluative judgement, the judgement that v is a value,
a socially beneficial goal, and also a factual or empirical judgement, to the effect that by
practising the factor-outcome link we promote the value.
The evaluative judgement involves deep and controversial philosophical issues. Are
values objective, conventional or merely subjective? Are they eternal and universal
or relative to particular times and places? The question of whether and how much
certain values are going to be advanced through certain practices concerns an empirical
connection, which undoubtedly is dependent upon changing socio-economical conditions.
Even if ultimate legal values remain unchanged, the ways in which the practice of a
specific rule impacts on them may change over time (a similar change would also concern
instrumental values, but I will not consider them here).
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For example, it may be argued that under the circumstances prevailing in modern
industrialised countries, hunting has lost its ancient economic function: rather then
contributing to productivity, it may detract from it. This may be true especially when
hunting hinders some forms of recreation (watching wild animals, hiking, etc.) and so
jeopardises the livelihood of those involved in the corresponding economical activities
(hotel personnel, tour operators, tourist guides, etc.). In such a context, a factor description
such as 〈πChase,Π,Mprod〉 (the fact that plaintiff is chasing a wild animal favours an
outcome for his side, since this decisional practice, by facilitating hunting, promotes more
productivity) is inappropriate: hunting does not promote social productivity, but rather
impairs it.
To model this phenomenon, we need to temporalise factor descriptions (and dimension
descriptions), so as to be capable of building theories which can explain conflicting
decisions, adopted on the basis of the same set of factors, but taken at different times,
when the impact of (the practice of) the rules using those factors on the relevant values has
changed. This requires some changes and refinements in the definitions we have provided,
but seems fully compatible with the bases of our approach. For an attempt in this direction,
see [44].
5.4. Links to texts of decisions
In the debate on precedent, formalistic (strict) and anti-formalistic (sceptic) approaches
are frequently opposed (cf., e.g., [29, p. 157]; [49, p. 311]). The first approach construes the
binding meaning of the precedent on the basis of the text of the opinion and the plausible
intention of the judge. The record of the case includes therefore the detailed argumentation
with was developed at the time when it was decided. The meaning of the case is reduced
to one rule (the ratio decidendi) which can be extracted from that argumentation.
The latter approach looks beyond the text and its author, by considering interpretations
given by subsequent judges, and more generally, by providing a holistic interpretation of
the development of case law. The record of the case is therefore basically limited to the
facts of the decision plus its outcome (according to the jurisprudential model proposed
by Goodhart [21]). It is up to the interpreter, using all materials involved, to provide an
explanation in the framework of the body of the case law.
In our approach we have mainly taken the anti-formalistic side: the explanation of a case
is not given by the expressed opinion of the judge, but by the theory which more coherently
explains the body of the case law. This does not imply, however, that expressed opinions
are necessarily irrelevant in a coherence-based approach, so that we can take on board the
concerns that underlie the formalistic approach.
In fact, we may expand the background knowledge available to the parties, for example,
with information concerning the statements of the judges and the context of their utterance.
This would lead to a further theory-construction profile: the need to make sense of the
“history” of the case, and in particular of the judges’ opinions, in the circumstances where
they were stated. So, the record of a case, besides the dimensional qualifications (or the
factors) and the outcome, may also include the rules and arguments asserted by the judges.
An additional profile of the coherence of a theory would be the way in which the theory
can successfully incorporate those rules and arguments into the explanations it provides.
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How to implement this profile, and how to relate it to the aspects of coherence we indicate
above, and to balance it with them, will be the object of further research.
5.5. Implementation
We have implemented the framework defined in Definitions 1–20 above in PROLOG.
The process of implementation was relatively straightforward as the definitions have a
fairly direct mapping into PROLOG. For example, the implementation of Definition 19 is:
arbitraryRulePref(Theory,R1,R2):-
retract(theory(Theory,TCases,
TFactors,TRules,TPrefs,TValPrefs)),
member([R1,[F1,O]],TRules),
member([R2,[F2,O2]],TRules),
ruleval(F1,V1), ruleval(F2,V2),
asserta(theory(Theory,TCases,TFactors,
TRules,[pref(R1,R2)|TPrefs],
[vp(V1,V2)|TValPrefs])).
Having implemented the definitions we embedded them in a menu system. The menu
simply provides access to calls to the theory constructors, together with options to display
the theory, list the cases explained by the theory, and to list the background cases and factor
definitions. The program is perhaps not very exciting, but it does allow a user to construct
theories ensured to be correct in accordance with the definitions, and to check that the
expected consequences can be delivered.4
We are currently expanding the implementation along the lines described above:
extracting factors from dimensions, testing the coherence of the developed theories, and
allowing for abstract factors. The ultimate aim would be to construct a program which
provides an effective help in producing the best theory for a given side in a given new case
against a given background of precedents, factors or dimensions. Such a program would
require both heuristics to pick the theory constructors to use, and to evaluate the theories
constructed.
6. Summary and conclusions
The main object of this paper has been to present a formal account of reasoning with
case law as building, evaluating and using theories. We have articulated the elements of
such theories, provided constructors to build them, and suggested ways in which they can
be evaluated and used. We have illustrated the formalism using a well known example.
We have shown how such theories could be used to argue for and against positions
with respect to as yet undecided cases, and to account for a body of decided cases. We
have shown how our model can be expanded to accommodate some special features of
4 The initial Prolog program has recently been re-engineered in JAVA to provide a robust, fully functioning
implementation of the basic model with a graphical user interface. Additionally this program has the capacity to
generate executable Prolog code corresponding to the theory. This work is described in [13].
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particular systems. Finally we have shown how the basic moves in the currently most
developed implementations of reasoning with case law can be expressed in our formalism.
We believe that the work provides insight into reasoning with cases in the following
ways:
• We see reasoning with cases as involving all of the construction of a theory, the
application of that theory, and the evaluation of competing theories. The above gives a
precise account of all these elements, while maintaining a clear conceptual separation
between them.
• Our formal account is sufficient to reconstruct the reasoning and argument moves
common to several existing case-based reasoning systems, making clear at which
points theory construction, application and evaluation are involved.
• Our formal account can be extended to accommodate additional features built into
some systems, such as dimensions in HYPO and the factor hierarchy of CATO, which
go beyond reasoning with a flat set of factors.
• A problem with many models of legal reasoning is that they indicate what arguments
can be made, but fail to account for why an argument might be persuasive. Our
account distinguishes two levels of persuasion. Firstly we can show some arguments
to be persuasive in terms of values: a value preference derived from a rule preference
exhibited in a decided case can be used to derive a new rule preference applicable to
other cases. Secondly arguments can be found persuasive by a comparative evaluation
of the competing theories from which they derive. We have suggested some criteria
which could be used to compare theories.
• We have identified a number of topics for future work, especially regarding comparison
of values, and a quantifiable measure of theory coherence.
Of course, much work is needed to capture the full richness of current case based systems.
None the less we think we have provided some firm foundations on which such work can
be built.
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